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This study addresses two questions: Is there earnings management in the REIT 
industry? How are earnings management practices affected by firm-specific factors? 
Discretionary accruals methods are used to measure management in earnings. In 
addition, the difference between actual and expected FFO is used to capture the 
potential FFO manipulation. Capital market-related incentives for financial results 
manipulation can be divided into two types: specific event-driven and 
benchmark-driven. Both types of incentives are examined in this study. With regards 
to the specific event case, seasoned equity offering (SEO) is selected as the specific 
event around which financial results might be manipulated. As for the second case, 
zero earnings/FFO and zero growth in earnings/FFO are chosen as the two 
benchmarks in testing whether REITs manipulate their financial results to surpass 
certain thresholds.  
Clear evidence of FFO manipulation around SEOs is found in this study, but the 
extent of earnings management is relatively weaker than that in industrial firms. It is 
found that REITs that issue SEOs more often are more aggressive in manipulating 
FFO and less so in managing earnings. Moreover, there is a notable difference 
between these two types of financial results manipulation. A mean-reversion trend is 
found in discretionary accruals, but not for FFO manipulation. Combined with the 
supportive findings in testing the benchmark-driven earnings management, this study 
demonstrates that manipulation in financial results of REITs is influenced by various 
factors. Financial constraints, frequent SEOs and slack governance are the features of 
REITs more likely to manipulate financial results.
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivations and Objectives 
This study focuses on earnings management issues in the REIT industry. Two 
questions are addressed: Is there earnings management in the REIT industry? If so, 
how is earnings management behavior affected by various factors? 
Studying earnings management in a REIT context is interesting for several 
reasons. First, because of the strict regulatory rules, tangible property assets and 
highly predictable cash flow, the REIT industry has been thought to be more 
transparent than other industries. In such a transparent industry with less asymmetric 
information, is it possible that REITs can manipulate their financial results? 
Second, to maintain tax-exempt status, REITs are required to pay out a high 
percentage of their taxable income and hence have to rely heavily on external 
financing sources to fund their investments and expansions. Therefore, they are forced 
to go to the capital markets more frequently than general stocks. How would this 
difference in capital raising feature influence REITs’ earnings management behavior? 
Third, a unique characteristic of the REIT industry is that there are two 
performance measures both closely monitored by market participants: Net Income (NI) 
and Funds From Operation (FFO). NI is calculated within the framework of generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), while FFO is initiated and promoted by the 
REIT industry itself and not ruled by GAAP. In face of these two equally important 
 2
performance measures, how would earnings management 1  behavior of REIT 
managers be affected, if any? 
1.2 Background and Research Strategy 
Earnings management issues in earnings and FFO are discussed separately in this 
study. Discretionary accruals methods such as cross-sectional modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al. 1995) and working capital accruals model (Teoh et al. 1998) are used 
to measure manipulation of earnings. In addition, the difference between actual and 
expected FFO is employed to capture the potential manipulation of FFO.  
The earnings management literature can be categorized according to different 
incentives to manipulate financial results. Capital market incentives examine how 
earnings management practices are affected by factors related to the capital market 
while non-capital market incentives focus on internal and external contracts between 
different stakeholders. This study mainly focuses on capital market incentives.  
The literature on earnings management driven by capital market-related 
incentives can be further divided into two directions: specific event-driven and 
benchmark-driven. They are actually two different directions in examining earnings 
management. The specific event direction states that firms manage their performance 
around specific events such as Initial Public Offerings (IPO), Seasoned Equity 
Offerings (SEO) and merger. The benchmark incentive indicates that firms manipulate 
their financial results in order to exceed certain thresholds, failing which they would 
be punished by the capital market. Both cases will be tested in this study. The specific 
event selected to test the first direction is SEO. Financial results in the five quarters 
                                                        
1
 In this study, manipulation of FFO is taken as a unique earnings management even though theoretically FFO is 
not an earnings measure. In this study, the term earnings management and manipulation are used interchangeably. 
 3
around SEOs are examined to test whether there is earnings management. To test the 
benchmark direction, zero earnings/FFO and zero growth in earnings/FFO are 
employed as benchmarks.   
1.3 Results and Contributions 
It is found that REITs do manage earnings around SEOs, but the extent varies. 
Evidence for earnings management around SEOs in the REIT industry is weaker than 
in industrial firms. In contrast, the extent of FFO manipulation by a REIT is positively 
associated with its frequency of equity offerings. The more frequently REITs go to 
capital market and issue seasoned equity, the more aggressive they are in 
manipulating FFO and the less so in manipulating earnings. 
There are notable differences between manipulation of net income and FFO. 
There is a mean-reversion trend in discretionary working capital accruals, but not for 
FFO manipulation. This suggests that earnings management cannot persist for a long 
period, but manipulation of FFO has no such limitation. This result explains in part 
why the focus of manipulation shifts from earnings to FFO as SEO frequency 
increases. Financial manipulation in the REIT industry is influenced by various 
factors. Limited capability to generate cash flow, high leverage, high volatility in cash 
flow, frequent SEOs and slack corporate governance are the features of REITs that are 
more likely to manipulate financial results. 
Additionally, in testing the benchmark direction, it is found that REITs manage 
their earnings/FFO in an attempt to avoid reporting losses or declines in earnings/FFO. 
High leverage, high M/B and constrained cash flow generating ability are basically 
associated with earnings management in these scenarios. However, the relation 
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between earnings management and the REIT size is mixed.  
In summary, REITs with financial constraints, frequent equity offerings and weak 
corporate governance are more likely to manipulate financial results. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The next section reviews relevant literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 
discusses how to measure manipulation of earnings and FFO. Section 4 presents and 
interprets the empirical results of univariate analysis and multivariate regressions. 
Section 5 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Earnings Management 
Cash flows are a noisy measure of firm performance because there are timing 
and matching problems associated with cash flow recognitions. To address these 
problems and to mitigate timing and matching shortcomings of cash flows, General 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) introduce accruals to adjust the timing and 
matching of cash flows in calculating earnings. Earnings management is closely 
related to accrual accounting. Earnings are the measure of firm performance produced 
under the accrual basis of accounting (Dechow, 1994). This measure is believed to be 
more informative in evaluating performance than cash flows.  
As mentioned by the FASB in various Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts, the primary focus of financial reporting is information about an enterprise’s 
performance provided by measures of earnings and its components. The principal role 
of accrual accounting is to help investors better assess the entity’s economic 
performance during a period. By using basic accounting procedures such as accrual, 
deferral, allocation and matching, earnings results can convey more information than 
merely listing the cash receipts and outlays (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). In this 
process, managers are allowed to use their own judgment to make financial reporting 
more informative for users through accounting choices or estimations.  
Although managerial judgment in financial reporting can make financial results 
more informative, there are possible downsides. Managerial discretion over 
accounting choices and estimations could be used to intentionally distort information 
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and mislead both internal and external financial reports users. Within GAAP, 
managers have considerable flexibility in the choice of inventory methods, bad debt 
allowance, expensing versus capitalization, recognition of sales, estimation of pension 
liabilities, stretching out payables, delay in booking maintenance expenditures, 
securitizations of receivables and so on. These are all examples of earnings 
management. Healy and Wahlen (1999) provide a comprehensive review of the 
earnings management literature from the perspective of regulators and standard setters. 
They define earnings management as follows: “Earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers”.  
There are two important points in this definition to notice when analyzing 
earnings management. First, managerial incentives are important in the analysis of 
earnings management because managerial manipulation choices are affected by 
different incentives. Second, it is necessary to identify the accounting discretion in 
unexpected accruals or accounting choices. This is about how to identify earnings 
management. These two critical points in the definition are also reflected in the 
research design of this thesis in which the two problems of why and how will be 
discussed separately. In this section, two types of manipulation incentives are 
reviewed, that is, capital market-driven incentives and non-capital market incentives. 
In this study, more emphasis is placed on capital market-driven incentives which 
include two directions: the specific event direction and the benchmark direction. In 
section 3, the question of how to measure manipulation will be discussed in more 
detail. Manipulation of both earnings and FFO will be examined respectively. 
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2.2 Non-Capital Market Incentives 
There are two major streams of incentives to manipulate financial results: 
non-capital market incentives and capital market incentives. The difference lies in 
whether the incentives are driven by capital market related factors. Non-capital 
market incentives, also termed as contracting theory, focus on contractual incentives 
to manage earnings. One function of accounting information is to help monitor and 
regulate the contracts between the firm and its stakeholders. For example, 
management compensation contracts are used to reduce the agency cost and align the 
incentives of management and external stakeholders. Lending covenants are specified 
to limit manager actions that benefit the firm’s shareholders at the expense of its 
creditors. Government regulation can also be interpreted as another contract between 
the government and firms. These contracts all create incentives for earnings 
management. Management compensation plans (DeAngelo 1988; Dechow and Sloan, 
1991), debt covenant restrictions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994) and government regulation (Jones 1995) may influence managerial 
incentive to manage earnings. The incentives for managers to make particular 
accounting choices depend on the terms of contracts, for example, setting executive 
compensation, labor wage negotiation, proxy contests and debt covenants (Chung et al, 
2002).  
A number of studies have examined compensation contracts to identify 
managerial earnings management incentives because the rewards to a firm's senior 
managers depend both implicitly and explicitly on the earnings achieved on their 
watch (Healy 1999). Healy (1985) is among the first to investigate earnings 
management and earnings-based bonus scheme. It is logical to suspect that managers 
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under such a bonus scheme would manipulate profits to smooth their remuneration so 
that they can get better rewards. Healy finds that managers are more likely to choose 
income-increasing accruals when their bonus plans have no upper bound and 
income-decreasing accruals when these bounds are binding. DeAngelo (1988) finds 
that during proxy contest managers choose to exercise accounting discretion to 
improve reported earnings which can benefit them as a result. Improved financial 
results can give them advantage in the contest. Dechow and Sloan (1991) report that 
CEOs in their final years in office reduce R&D spending in order to increase reported 
profits. They show that this behavior is consistent with the short-term nature of their 
compensation contracts. By reducing R& D expenses, they can boost financial results 
in the current period which are directly related to their own benefits. In short, 
evidence reported in these studies shows that managers use accounting judgment to 
increase earnings-based bonus awards. These are all examples of earnings 
management caused by management compensation contracts. 
Other studies have examined whether constraints set in debt covenants would 
induce managers to manipulate earnings. In debt covenants, creditors impose 
restrictions on dividends payout, share repurchases and issuance of extra debt in order 
to ensure repayment of their principal and interest (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
These restrictions are usually expressed in terms of financial ratios such as working 
capital ratio, interest coverage ratio and net assets. Therefore, managers would tend to 
choose particular accounting methods to increase reported earnings and avoid 
breaching such restrictions. Sweeney (1994) examines accounting changes, costs of 
default and accounting-based covenants violated by 130 firms that report violations in 
annual reports. The author finds that for firms that are approaching default, managers 
tend to use income-increasing accounting changes. In the analysis, earnings 
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management is affected by the default costs imposed by lenders and the accounting 
flexibility managers have. Similarly, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) examine a group 
of firms which violated their lending covenants. They find that income-increasing 
accruals are aggressively employed in the year prior to covenant violation. They take 
this behavior as evidence that firms attempt to postpone violating lending covenants 
as long as possible. Earnings management is one of their tools to avoid breaching 
restrictions set in debt contracts. 
Another stream of earnings management literature is about taxation and industry 
regulation. The tax-related research finds evidence that firms make accounting 
choices to reduce tax burden. Most of the research examining the effect of 
government regulation on accounting choice is based upon industry-specific 
regulations. For instance, banking regulations require that banks satisfy certain capital 
adequacy requirements in terms of accounting ratios. As a response, banks tend to 
manage relevant accounts in order to avoid falling short of the requirements. Collins 
et al. (1995) find that banks that are close to minimum capital requirements tend to 
overstate loan loss provisions and understate loan write-offs. Similarly, firms in 
regulated industry such as utilities have been permitted to only a normal return on 
their invested assets. The normal practice in this situation would be using 
profit-decreasing accruals and control reported earnings within an acceptable range. It 
is asserted that such regulations create incentives for managers to control earnings and 
balance sheet variables. Jones (1991) posits that firms seeking import relief tend to 
defer income in the year of application. Poor financial performance would help firms 
to get more support from the government. Cahan (1992) find that firms under 
anti-trust investigation report income-decreasing abnormal accruals in investigation 
years. Understating earnings intentionally would benefit these firms in face of the 
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regulation or investigation from the government. In summary, these studies show that 
regulatory issues induce firms to manage earnings. 
The incentives highlighted above are not driven by capital market factors and 
thus are included in the non-capital market incentives. As mentioned, non-capital 
market incentives mainly focus on contractual incentives to manage earnings. These 
incentives are determined by different contracts among stakeholders, that is, managers, 
shareholders, creditors and government, etc. Next, incentives related to capital market 
are introduced and analyzed.  
2.3 Capital Market Incentives 
In examining capital market related incentives, it is stated that managers can 
intentionally mislead investors about the underlying value of the firms either to 
obscure a firm’s fundamental value or to affect resource allocation (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999). The widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial 
analysts can create incentives for earnings management. As a result, Dechow and 
Skinner (2000) argue that the more fruitful way to identify firms whose managers 
practice earnings management is to focus more on capital market incentives.  
There are basically two branches of papers that discuss capital market incentives 
for earnings management. The benchmark direction states that managers manipulate 
financial results to surpass certain benchmarks monitored by market participants or 
they will be punished by the capital market once falling short of these benchmarks. 
The specific event perspective is about earnings management around specific events 
such as equity offerings and takeovers. Around these specific events, managers may 
manipulate financial results in an attempt to mislead investors about the fair valuation 
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of the firm.  
These two directions are quite different and this difference is also reflected in the 
research design of this study. This study mainly focuses on possible financial results 
manipulation in the REIT industry. Both cases are examined while the specific event 
direction has been paid more attention to. SEO is chosen as the specific event to 
detect possible financial results manipulation during the five quarters around SEOs. 
Additionally, several benchmarks are also examined in this thesis as a supplement to 
the findings in testing the specific event issues. Results of these two parts are finally 
combined into an overall conclusion about possible financial results manipulation in 
the REIT industry. 
2.3.1 Specific Event 
In the first subset of the capital market incentives, attention is paid to specific 
events that create opportunities for earnings management. Specific events include 
initial public offering (IPO), seasoned equity offerings (SEO), takeovers, etc. The 
intuition is that firms may take advantage of the asymmetric information and 
manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence the valuation of the firm and hence 
benefit themselves in these events. 
In a paper discussing potential earnings management prior to management 
buyouts, Perry and Williams (1994) find that unexpected accruals are significant even 
when changes in revenues and depreciable capital are controlled. The results show 
that managers intentionally use income-decreasing accruals to reduce earnings before 
management buyouts. Understated financial results would drag down share prices and 
hence reduce their buyout costs. Erickson and Wong (1999) examine earnings 
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management around stock-financed acquisitions and find that there is a reversal of 
abnormal accruals following stock-financed acquisitions. This means managers use 
discretionary accruals to boost earnings before acquisitions in order to push up share 
prices. Therefore, they will benefit when acquisitions are financed using these stocks. 
These are both examples of earnings management around specific events such as 
Management Buyout (MBO) and merger & acquisition (M&A). Earnings 
management is used as a tool to manipulate stock prices in favor of management. 
Equity offerings also provide a direct incentive to manage earnings. Dechow et al. 
(1996) suggest that one important motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire 
to attract external financing at low cost. If issuers can increase reported earnings, they 
can improve the terms on which securities are sold to the public, giving direct benefits 
to themselves and their firms. A higher price benefits the firm because the issuer can 
receive more money from the offerings. Additionally, for the same amount of money 
to be raised, there will be less dilution of ownership caused by the new shares. Given 
these incentives, it is reasonable to suspect that managers tend to manage earnings 
higher before issuing equity. 
Recent studies have examined whether earnings are managed higher before IPO 
(Teoh et al., 1998a; Teoh et al. 1998) and SEO (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998b; 
Shivakumar 2000; Kim and Park 2005). Teoh et al. (1998) find that IPO firms, on 
average, have high positive issue-year earnings and abnormal accruals, followed by 
poor long-term performance and negative abnormal accruals. They show that these 
high abnormal accruals are achieved by employing income-increasing depreciation 
policies and reducing uncollectible accounts receivables. Teoh et al. (1998a) provide 
evidence that the most aggressive IPO issuers have a three-year market return of 
 13
nearly 20% less than the most conservative IPO issuers. This provides evidence that 
financial results are boosted by managers before IPO to improve the terms on which 
shares are sold. 
Rangan (1998), Teoh et al. (1998b) and Shivakumar (2000) examine the relation 
between SEOs and earnings management. They argue that earnings management may 
be one explanation for the stock underperformance following SEOs. Managers 
overstate earnings before SEOs because of opportunism. By overstating earnings 
before offerings, managers try to mislead investors and issue stocks at higher prices. 
These authors find reported earnings of SEO firms are unusually high at the time of 
SEO and these high earnings are caused by abnormally high accruals.  
Rangan (1998) suggests that investors can not effectively “undo” earnings 
management at the time of SEOs, but they are subsequently disappointed by 
predictable declines in earnings caused by earnings management. Rangan (1998) and 
Teoh et al. (1998b) both find a strong association between the extent of earnings 
management and the underperformance following equity offerings. Firms with higher 
accruals at offerings tend to have worse performance during the years after offerings. 
In sum, their findings support the hypothesis that investors naively extrapolate 
managed earnings and therefore overvalue the firms. Managers can use earnings 
management skills to boost financial performance before seasoned equity offerings. 
Rangan (1998) examines a sample of 230 SEOs from the years 1987-1990 and 
finds that discretionary accruals during the offering year are negatively correlated 
with earnings changes in the following year. Discretionary accruals around the 
offering also predict poor stock returns in the following year. The ability of 
discretionary accruals to predict stock returns is robust to the inclusion of sales growth, 
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capital expenditure growth, firm size and market to book ration as additional 
predictors. He concludes that issuing firms can manipulate their stock prices by 
managing earnings and the market appears to extrapolate earnings growth associated 
with discretionary accruals and hence overvalues issuing firms. After the offerings, 
when the reversal of accruals causes earnings to decline, the market corrects its 
valuation errors and stock prices fall as a result.  
Teoh et al. (1998b) also find evidence for earnings management at SEOs. They 
document that discretionary accruals grow before the offering, peak in the offering 
year, and decline thereafter. This accruals pattern causes earnings to grow before, peak 
in and decline after the offering year. The post-issue net income decline is especially 
profound for issuers who aggressively manage discretionary accruals before issue. 
Additionally, they find a negative relation between pre-issue earnings management 
and post-issue earnings and stock returns. This relationship remains after controlling 
for firm size, market to book ratio and post-issue capital expenditures. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that investors naively trust pre-issue earnings and 
ignore relevant information contained in pre-issue discretionary accruals. An 
information imperfect market is too optimistic when equity is offered and later on 
becomes disappointed when the high earnings can not be sustained. This explains why 
there is underperformance after equity offerings. 
Shivakumar (2000) points out that tests done by Rangan and Teoh et al. listed 
above are severely mis-specified due to the skewness in long-term returns data and the 
survival bias in their sample selection. Moreover, he points out that investors can 
rationally infer the earnings management at equity offerings announcements and 
hence reduce their price response to expected earnings released which is different 
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from the results in Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998b). As a point of departure 
from the above two studies, Shivakumar raises a Managerial Response Hypothesis 
based on the game theory and adverse selection model. It states that investors assume 
that firms announcing SEOs have all previously managed earnings upward, and 
therefore discount these firms’ stock prices. In this situation, issuers who have not 
previously manipulated earnings would unfairly suffer stock price declines at offering 
announcements. As a result, it is rational for issuers to manage earnings higher before 
SEO announcements. He finds that earnings management by issuers is wasteful on 
average and can be unraveled by investors well before an equity offering, as can be 
explained by the rational expectations framework the author proposes. Rather than 
intend to mislead investors, earnings management may actually be the rational 
response by issuers to anticipated market behavior at offering announcements. 
Previous studies (Teoh et al., 1998; Rangan, 1998; Shivakumar, 2000) examine 
earnings management around SEOs and find that there is a negative correlation 
between pre-offering earnings management and post-offering stock returns, but none 
of these studies directly examines the relation between earnings management and the 
pricing of SEOs. In contrast, Kim and Park (2005) points out earnings are managed 
only when equity issuers benefit from manipulation. Examining the relation between 
earnings management by SEO firms and the pricing of their offers is more important 
and direct if issuers want to manage earnings in order to boost the offering price and 
thus reduce the cost of capital because this is directly related to the issuer’s wealth. 
They argue that equity issuers have incentives to boost earnings before offerings and 
push offer prices up to increase offering proceeds because net income is an important 
factor in determining the value of firms. Firms with better financial results could have 
more advantage in bargaining over offering price with underwriting investment banks. 
 16
Kim and Park examine a sample of 1,040 SEOs from 1989 through 2000. Their 
finding, so called issuer’s greed hypothesis, indicates that firms opportunistically 
exercise accounting discretion to issue new equity at inflated prices. There is a 
negative relation between SEO underpricing and earnings management. The negative 
relation is more significant for firms with high information asymmetry. All these 
studies show that there is earnings management around SEOs and earnings 
manipulation is used by managers to change stock prices and influence valuation of 
the firm. However, these papers merely focus on general stocks and REITs, as a 
regulated industry, are normally dropped from their analysis. 
Ghosh et al. (2000) examine the pricing of SEOs by U.S. equity REITs over the 
period of 1991-1996. They document that REIT SEOs are significantly underpriced 
and the underpricing extent is larger than that in 1980s. This reflects more information 
asymmetry for post-1990 REITs. However, earnings management has not been 
considered in their study.  
To the best of my knowledge, few studies have discussed earnings management 
in the REIT industry. There are several factors that make this study interesting. In 
such a relatively transparent industry, is it possible for managers to manipulate 
financial results? Because of their tax-exempt status and the high payout ratio 
requirement, REITs need to issue stocks more frequently than general stocks. How 
would the frequency in equity offering affect earnings management practices? 
Moreover, how the unique dual performance measures in the REIT industry affect the 
earnings management choices of managers, if any. Therefore, possible earnings 
management around REIT SEOs is an interesting problem to explore. This study tries 
to fill this gap. 
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2.3.2 Benchmark 
The benchmark-driven incentive indicates that firms are expected to meet or beat 
certain earnings benchmarks, if not, they will be punished by the capital market. 
Degeorge et al. (1999) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) summarize that there are 
normally three thresholds that drive earnings management: (1) avoiding losses; (2) 
reporting increases in seasonally adjusted quarterly earnings; (3) meeting analysts’ 
expectations.  
When a large number of firms are included in a sample, their earnings and 
earnings increases should be normally distributed. However, several studies report 
that small reported losses are unusually rare, while small profits are unusually 
common. At the same time, small drops in earnings are unusually rare, while small 
increases in earnings are unusually common (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Burgstahler, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999, Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). These 
findings are considered as evidence that managers manipulate earnings to avoid 
missing certain benchmarks. As a result of this manipulation, small positive profits 
and small positive profit growth are abnormally common while small negative profits 
and small profit declines are abnormally rare. Additionally, Degeorge et al. (1999) 
also find that the number of cases in which analysts’ forecasts are just exactly met or 
slightly beaten is unusually high, while the marginal miss cases are unusually rare.  
Several papers document that meeting these benchmarks is vital to market 
participants and managers. Barth et al. (1999) and Myers and Skinner (2000) both 
show that firms reporting continued growth in earnings are priced at a premium to 
other firms, other things being equal. The premium increases with the length of the 
growth string, and the premium is reduced when the string is broken. This result is 
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similar to the finding of DeAngelo et al. (1996) that firms breaking a pattern of 
consistent earnings growth experience an average 14% negative abnormal stock return 
in the year the pattern is broken. Skinner and Sloan (2000) find that the stock price 
response to earnings disappointments is disproportionally large for growth stocks. 
Thus, even when these firms report very small misses, they suffer abnormally large 
stock price declines. There seem to be strong incentives for earnings management to 
surpass the thresholds. If managers know that stock prices would respond strongly to 
adverse earnings information or negative surprises, it is natural to anticipate that they 
would take steps to avoid such bad news, especially if they have personal wealth 
increasingly associated with stock prices either in stocks or in options. One of their 
choices is earnings management. 
Degeorge et al. (1999) try to explain these thresholds from three psychological 
effects. First, there is something fundamental about positive and non-positive numbers 
in human thought process. Hence, this dividing line carries over for the threshold on 
absolute earnings. Second, according to the prospect theory, individuals choosing 
among risky alternatives behave as if they evaluate outcomes as changes from a 
reference point. In the analysis context, earnings in the same quarter last year can be 
used as a reference point. Third, people depend on rules of thumb to reduce 
transaction costs. Analyst forecasts are usually used as this kind of reference in the 
capital market. When a firm falls short of analysts’ forecasts, managers will be 
thought to have performed poorly. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) also apply the 
prospect theory as an explanation which highlights the importance of a reference point. 
Zero changes of earnings and zero levels of earnings are both natural reference points. 
These are the two benchmarks to be discussed in this study. 
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Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find that the two components of earnings, 
operating cash flow and changes in working capital, are used to achieve earnings 
surprises. Based upon former studies, Burgstahler and Eames (2006) examine both 
earnings management and analysts’ forecast management. They indicate that both 
operating cash flow and discretionary accruals components of earnings are managed 
to realize zero or small positive earnings surprises.  
Degeorge et al. (1999) provide a hierarchy among the three benchmarks 
discussed above. They find that the most important benchmark for managers to 
surpass is to avoid losses. Once profitability is achieved, it becomes important to 
report an increase in quarterly earnings. Once quarterly increases are in place, the goal 
shifts to meeting analyst forecasts. Accordingly, this study will focus on the first two 
thresholds, that is, to avoid losses and to avoid declines in earnings. In contrast to 
previous studies which only focus on general stocks, both GAAP earnings and FFO 
are discussed in testing the benchmark direction in this research thesis.  
Given that testing earnings management around SEOs is the main focus of this 
thesis, the analysis of the benchmark-driven manipulation only serves as a supplement 
and is presented at the end of this study as a side test. In addition to the three 
benchmarks discussed above, there is another benchmark unique to the REIT industry, 
that is, managers may manipulate results to maintain their REIT status. But this 




2.4 Performance Management in REITs 
A distinct feature of the REIT industry is the dual performance measures. One is 
earnings, which is calculated within the framework of generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). The other one is FFO initiated and promoted by the REIT industry 
itself and not governed by GAAP.  
Claiming that net income is misleading in measuring the operating performance 
of real estate industry, National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(NAREIT) published a White Paper to give a formal definition to FFO in 1991. 
NAREIT argues that GAAP historical cost depreciation of real estate assets is 
generally not correlated with changes in the value of those assets, whose value does 
not diminish predictably over time, as historical cost depreciation implies. 
Subsequently, NAREIT has updated the White Paper several times2 and made some 
revisions to the definition. NAREIT promotes FFO as an industry-specific 
performance measure that could resemble GAAP earnings as closely as possible. 
Though NAREIT does not intend FFO to be used either as a measure of cash 
generated by REITs or its dividend payout capacity, FFO actually reflects operating 
cash flow generated as a result of the REIT portfolio operation, indicating the 
cash-generating capability of a REIT. 
Normally most REITs report quarterly results using FFO numbers. However, 
REIT analysts from several Wall Street firms announced in 2001 that they would 
include EPS estimates in REIT research reports along with FFO. Going forward, they 
                                                        
2
 NAREIT updated the White Paper in 1995, 1999 and 2002 consequently, making additional disclosure 
requirement on certain specific accounts. 
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would promote a consistent method for calculating EPS. This has caused a debate 
over which method is the better way to measure financial performance of REITs. EPS 
depreciation calculations can be overly conservative, but it is an audited measure 
which is fairly consistent from company to company. A uniform performance measure 
will make it easier for investors to compare REITs with other general stocks. The SEC 
permits REITs to disclose FFO as an industry-specific measure under the accounting 
standard SFAS No.131 but requires that REITs must still report GAAP earnings as 
their primary measure of operating performance (Gore and Stott, 1998). 
Over time, FFO and changes in FFO have become two of the most common 
measures of REIT management performance and are used for determining the 
compensation level for REIT managers (Vincent 1999). Even though FFO is very 
popular and widely regarded by the industries as a better measure of performance than 
GAAP earnings, there are still some concerns about its exposure to manipulation. FFO 
is a non-GAAP measure, which mean its calculation and presentation are not subject 
to consistency rules or outstanding audits (Fields et al. 1998). For instance, FFO is not 
calculated consistently across REITs, and is not reconciled to net income by many 
REITs (Vincent 1999). Moreover, in their financial reports many REITs do not 
provide sufficient information about how FFO is calculated. In the absence of clear 
definitions about the calculation of FFO and without legal obligations to follow 
NAREIT guidelines, REITs managers have substantial discretion to decide which 
items are included or excluded when calculating FFO. By examining REITs' financial 
reports, it can be found that accounts such as deferred percentage lease revenue, other 
income/expenses from property settlement, deferred financing cost, provision for loss 
on impairment, other amortization items, adjustments for unconsolidated joint 
ventures are up to the discretion of REIT managers when calculating FFO. 
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Additionally, Gore and Stott (1998) find that FFO is more closely associated with 
stock prices than net income. This result generally supports NAREIT’s claim that FFO 
is a more informative measure of firm performance than net income. Graham and 
Knight (2000) examine information content of net income and FFO. They have a 
similar finding that FFO is relatively more informative than net income in predicting 
stock return. It is natural to suspect that FFO might be more likely to be manipulated 
when discussing earnings management in the REIT industry.  
However, the problem of earnings management in the REIT industry is largely 
unexplored in the literature. Fields et al. (1998) discuss FFO manipulation problems 
in one section of their paper and suggest that REITs with limited free cash flow which 
have a higher need for external financing are more likely to manage FFO. Firms with 
lower profitability have greater incentives to manipulate FFO upward for capital 
market or compensation reasons. But they merely separate the REITs sample roughly 
into two groups, aggressive group and conservative group, and do not provide a direct 
measure of FFO manipulation. This limits their findings. Another paper on FFO 
manipulation is Zhu (2006) which focuses on earnings management around 
benchmarks. The author reports that managers manipulate FFO to meet benchmarks 
such as analysts’ forecasts and reported FFO of prior year. The results show that REIT 
managers exercise discretion in converting earnings to FFO to help beat analyst 
forecasts on FFO and to avoid FFO declines3.  
                                                        
3
 Zhu (2006) finds no evidence that managers manipulate GAAP earnings, but the author just briefly mentions the 
finding and does not provide the detailed calculation process. 
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2.5 Hypothesis Development 
2.5.1 Earnings Management and SEOs 
Research on firms that issue SEOs finds that reported earnings of offerings firms 
are unusually high at the time of SEO and these high earnings are attributed to 
unusually high accruals. If managers decide to issue equity well before the offering 
announcement, they would choose to manage earnings in advance to influence 
investor expectations toward the firm. Dechow et al. (1996) point out that one 
important motivation for earnings manipulation is to attract external financing at low 
cost. With window-dressed financial results, issuers can have an advantage in 
bargaining with underwriters over the terms on which securities are sold. At the same 
time, a higher price benefits the firm because the issuer can receive more money from 
the offering. For the same amount of money to be raised, there will be less dilution of 
ownership caused by the new shares.  
Despite the benefits from overstating earnings, there are potential costs 
associated with earnings management. Dechow et al. (1996) report that firms 
identified by SEC as earnings manipulators face higher cost of capital. Moreover, 
there is the possibility that qualified audit reports or lawsuits may damage the firm’s 
image and reputation. Therefore, it is logical to expect that managers would try their 
best to manage financial results. It is natural to expect that earnings management will 
continue for several quarters because this will make the manipulation smoother and 
more difficult to detect. Therefore, the quarters around offering announcement are 
most susceptible candidate for earnings management (Rangan, 1998). In this study all 
the five quarters around offering announcements are examined, especially quarters 
closely prior to the SEO quarter. 
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Hypothesis 1: There is financial results manipulation around SEOs.  
To maintain tax-exempt status, REITs are required to pay out a high percentage 
of their taxable income and hence have to rely heavily on external financing sources 
to fund their investments and expansions. Therefore, REITs has to go to capital 
market and raise fund more frequently than general stocks. As frequent SEO issuers, 
REITs face more scrutiny from various capital market participants. This feature is 
expected to influence earnings management behavior of REIT managers.  
Dechow et al. (1996) suggest that managers of firms that require frequent 
external financing will report earnings conservatively to create a positive reputation in 
the market, from which they can benefit in subsequent offerings. These frequent 
issuers are defined as having two or more public offerings within two years. In 
previous studies on earnings management, SEOs that are too close to previous 
offerings are usually excluded from the sample, because when an offering is made, 
managers may have already anticipated the next offering in pipeline. This anticipation 
is suspected to change the managers’ incentives to engage in earnings management 
and the extent of earnings manipulation (Shivakumar 2000). Anticipating that there 
will be another offering soon after the current one, managers will have to leave some 
leeway in earnings management because too aggressive manipulation of financial 
results would probably hurt the firm’s reputation and thus incur higher financing costs 
for subsequent offerings. As discussed above, one characteristic of the REIT industry 
is frequent SEOs. This study will examine the relationship between REITs SEO 
frequency and financial results manipulation.  
Hypothesis 2: REITs with higher SEO frequency practice less manipulation. 
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2.5.2 Earnings Management and Financial Constraints 
The previous two hypotheses are mainly about variables related to SEO such as 
timing and frequency which are important because according to the specific event 
direction, SEOs provide the direct incentives for manipulation. Meanwhile, earnings 
management is still affected by other factors such as accounting quality, financial 
stability, information asymmetry and corporate governance. Factors other than SEOs 
can be divided into two types: financial features and information asymmetry-related 
governance arrangement. This section focuses on financial features related to earnings 
management and corporate governance-related factors are examined in the next 
section. 
Findings from Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) 
indicate that financially constrained firms are more likely to manipulate financial 
results. Fields et al. (1998) also point out that REITs with constrained free cash flow 
and a higher need for external financing are more likely to manage FFO. Firms with 
lower profitability have greater incentives to manipulate FFO upward for capital 
market or compensation reasons. In this study, financial features such as profit margin, 
leverage ratio, cash-generating ability and cash flow volatility are used to proxy for 
financial constraints. REITs that are not operating well are more susceptible to 
earnings management. The intuition is that when a REIT is not operating well, 
managers tend to have more incentives to manipulate financial results. Earnings 
manipulation in the previous period is also considered in the analysis. This is more 
about the reversing characteristic of accruals. Accruals have a mean-reversion feature 
(Sloan, 1996). Aggressive earnings management in previous period makes it harder to 
do the same thing for current period. High level accruals in previous quarter will 
 26
presumably limit managers’ ability to exert discretion in the current period. Therefore 
lagged values of earnings management measures are used in the study to control for 
the potential influence from prior manipulation.  
Cash flow is an important factor affecting managerial earnings management 
decisions. Cash flow is a very important consideration for REITs. Free cash flow, 
together with FFO and AFFO, are usually used by analysts to investigate the 
profitability of REITs. Cash flow is widely used to measure the financial constraints. 
Additionally, Pennathur and Shelor (2002) find that that REIT manager compensation 
is related to stock returns and Funds from Operation for the years 1997-1999. They 
find no link between compensation and EPS, whether the REIT is self-managed, or 
type of property in which the REIT specializes. As previously noted, REITs are 
required to pay out a high percentage of their taxable income. At the same time, any 
reduction in dividends will be probably interpreted by the market as a negative signal 
on REIT operation. Therefore, the ability to generate cash flow and the volatility of 
cash flow are critical for REITs. Financially constrained firms are more likely to 
manipulate earnings (Fields et al., 1998), diminished cash flow and highly volatile 
cash flow both indicate financial constraints; hence CFO is used in this study to 
control for the influence of cash flow on managers’ decision to manage earnings. CFO 
scaled by total assets is used in the study as a proxy for the firm’s ability to generate 
cash flow. Standard deviation of cash flows over the sample period is used to reflect 
cash flow volatility. If a REIT has limited capability to generate cash or face volatile 
cash flows from operation, it is expected to have more incentives to manage financial 
results. 
Leverage is expected to be positively correlated with earnings management. 
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Managers of firms facing debt covenants are more likely to use aggressive earnings 
management trying not to breach the debt covenants (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
REITs with high leverage have more financial constraints which might force 
managers to be more aggressive in manipulating financial results. Gearing ratio is 
used in the study to control for the possible impact of leverage on earnings 
management practices. 
Hypothesis 3: Financially constrained REITs tend to manipulate financial results. 
Other financial variables to capture firm-specific characteristics include firm size 
and market to book ratio (M/B ratio). Conclusions about the relationship between firm 
size and earnings management are mixed so far. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) posit 
that large firms are more likely to manipulate earnings. However, there are other 
researchers suggesting that size is negatively associated with earnings management 
(Becker et al., 1998; DeFond and Park, 1997). In the study, total assets are used as a 
proxy for firm size. M/B ratio reflects the premium or discount on net assets of a 
REIT. A high M/B ratio indicates that investors expect more growth from current net 
assets. This variable is expected to be positively correlated with financial results 
manipulation because managers are under pressure to justify the premium over net 
assets reflected in M/B ratio. 
2.5.3 Earnings Management and External Audit 
Dechow et al. (1996) provide evidence that corporate governance structures are 
most commonly associated with earnings manipulation. They indicate that low 
managerial oversight is a significant catalyst for earnings management. They find that 
firms subject to SEC enforcement actions are more likely to have weaker governance 
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structures. REITs with more asymmetric information and weak governance are most 
susceptible to financial results manipulation. In this study, external audit quality is 
used to reflect the information asymmetry and external monitoring. Institutional 
investor holding ratios are used to proxy for corporate governance.  
Becker et al. (1998) examine the relation between earnings management and 
audit quality. The results show that clients of Big 6 auditors report lower 
income-increasing discretionary accruals than those reported by clients of non-Big 6 
auditors. Firms with lower quality auditors have been found to have higher 
discretionary accruals Clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals 
that are, on average, 1.5-2.1 percent of total assets higher than the discretionary 
accruals reported by clients of Big 6 auditors. They also find that the mean and 
median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals are greater for firms with 
non-Big 6 auditors. This result also indicates that lower audit quality is associated 
with more "accounting flexibility".  
It is a widely used assumption in accounting literature that Big 6 auditors are of 
higher quality than non-Big 6 auditors. To test whether this assumption holds, Kim et 
al. (2003) investigate whether different audit effectiveness between Big 6 and non-Big 
6 auditors is influenced by a conflict or convergence of reporting incentives faced by 
corporate managers and external auditors. The results show that only when managers 
have incentives to prefer income-increasing accrual choices are Big 6 auditors more 
effective than non-Big 6 auditors in deterring and monitoring opportunistic earnings 
management. The above findings are robust to different proxies for opportunistic 
earnings management and different proxies for the direction of earnings management 
incentives. Therefore, this assumption about the relation between auditor quality and 
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earnings management is supported.  
High auditor quality is associated with more supervision and less earnings 
management. In this study, external auditor quality is used to capture supervision from 
outside. For REITs that hire external auditors of higher quality, the monitoring is 
stronger and thus earnings management should be less. In contrast, more manipulation 
for REITs with lower audit quality is expected. Due to the fundamental changes in the 
auditing industry4, a dummy variable of AUDIT is employed to reflect whether 
external auditors are Big 4 auditors or not. 
Additionally, financial reports for the fourth quarter are normally under the 
scrutiny of auditors, while the statements of the other three quarters are issued without 
outside audit (Shivakumar, 2000). A dummy variable Q4 is introduced to explore 
whether there is significant difference in earnings management between the audited 
and unaudited quarters. It is expected that earnings management in the fourth quarter 
is lower than in the other three quarters. This test also reflects the relation between 
external audit quality and earnings management. 
Hypothesis 4: REITs with high auditor quality have less manipulation. 
2.5.4 Earnings Management and Corporate Governance 
As REITs get increasingly accepted by institutional investors, institutional 
holding ratio is on the rise over time. Chan et al. (1998) document that prior to 1990, 
institutional investors invested more of their funds in other stocks than in REITs, 
whereas after 1990 they invest more of their funds in REITs than in other stocks. 
                                                        
4
 The Big 6 became the Big 5 in July 1998 when Price Waterhouse merged with Coopers & Lybrand to form 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. The Enron scandal prompted scrutiny of their financial reporting, which was audited by 
Arthur Andersen. Arthur Andersen was eventually indicted for obstruction of justice for shredding documents 
related to the audit in the 2001 Enron scandal. The resulting conviction meant the end for Arthur Andersen. Most 
of its business around the world has been sold to members of what is now the Big 4. 
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Institutional investors have the opportunity, resources and ability to monitor 
management. Whether institutions use these powers is partly a function of the size of 
their individual or collective holdings. Institutional investors with large shareholding 
are more likely to monitor the management because they will lose more money than 
investors who own a smaller shareholding and because the exit option becomes more 
expansive (Hsu and Koh, 2005).  
When institutional investors have relatively lower holdings, there is less 
incentive for them to monitor managerial opportunism. Therefore, institutions with 
large shareholdings tend to play an active role in monitoring managerial opportunism 
as it relates to accounting discretion and in curtailing the earnings management 
behavior of managers (Chung et al., 2002). They find that institutional investors play 
an active role in monitoring and curtailing the opportunistic behavior of managers. To 
roughly capture the supervision from large stake institutional holders, the sum of the 
three biggest institutional investors’ holding ratio is used as a proxy in this analysis. 
This variable is expected to be negatively correlated with earnings management, that 
is, REITs with higher institutional holdings have more supervision and less earnings 
management. 
Hypothesis 5: REITs with low institutional holdings tend to manipulate financial 
results. 
In addition, the variable “TIMESEQ” is introduced to find out if there exists a 
linear trend in earnings management practices over time. This is also related to the 
governance and regulation environment in the REIT industry. In order to help 
investors better understand and measure REITs’ performance, NAREIT has updated 
its guideline about the definition of FFO and its calculation method several times 
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since 1991. Moreover, SEC has also made some clarifications regarding the 
accounting issues in the REIT industry. Yearly dummy variables are used to detect 
changes across different years covered in the sample. 
At the same time, regulatory requirements in broader capital markets have been 
profoundly strengthened after a slew of financial scandals since the late 1990s. 
Accounting scandals at prominent companies such as Enron and WorldCom have 
dramatically shaken the confidence of investors. As a response, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act imposes a number of corporate governance rules on all public companies with 
stock traded in the US. As a result of these legislative and regulatory changes, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that as time passes by, earnings management practices in 
REIT industry are reducing because of more restrictive regulation and more scrutiny 
from investors. 
Hypothesis 6: Financial results manipulation is decreasing over time. 
2.5.5 Earnings Management and Benchmarks 
As mentioned in the literature review, Degeorge et al. (1999) summarize that 
there are normally three thresholds that provide incentives for earnings management: 
(1) avoiding losses; (2) reporting increases in seasonally adjusted quarterly earnings; 
(3) meeting analyst expectations. Burgstabler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. 
(l999) report that small declines in reported earnings are unusually rare, while small 
increases in reported earnings are unusually common. Dechow et al. (2003) also find 
that too few firms report small loss and too many firms report small profit. Shown in 
graphs, there will be a “kink” to the right in the distribution of net income. This means 
that more firms would report small positive profits or small growth in earnings. These 
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findings can be interpreted as evidence that managers manipulate earnings to avoid 
losses and earnings declines. Considering the unique characteristic of the REIT 
industry, where both earnings and FFO are closely monitored by market participants, 
it is natural to expect that REITs managers will exercise manipulation to avoid losses 
and declines in both earnings and FFO. The first six hypotheses will be tested using 
both univariate analysis and multivariate regression. Different from the hypotheses 
related to Specific Event theory, hypotheses 7 and 8 will be tested separately in 
Section 4.4. 
Hypothesis 7: REITs manipulate earnings/FFO to avoid losses in earnings/FFO. 
Hypothesis 8: REITs manipulate financial results to avoid declines in earnings/FFO. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 2 reviews related literature on earnings management and points out that 
this study focuses on capital market-driven incentives. Two types of incentives for 
earnings management related to capital markets, termed as Specific Event and 
Benchmark, will be discussed in this study respectively.  
Here is a summary of the hypotheses to be tested: 
Hypothesis 1: There is financial results manipulation around SEOs. 
Hypothesis 2: REITs with higher SEO frequency practice less manipulation. 
Hypothesis 3: Financially constrained REITs tend to manipulate financial results. 
Hypothesis 4: REITs with high auditor quality have less manipulation. 
Hypothesis 5: REITs with low institutional-holdings tend to manipulate results. 
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Hypothesis 6: Financial results manipulation is decreasing over time. 
Hypothesis 7: REITs manipulate earnings/FFO to avoid losses in earnings/FFO.  
Hypothesis 8: REITs manipulate financial results to avoid declines in 
earnings/FFO. 
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Chapter 3 Measuring Manipulation 
3.1 Measuring Earnings Management 
Since earnings management can not be directly measured, researchers have 
developed several methods of approximating potential earnings management, 
including the total accruals method, the discretionary accruals method, the single 
accrual method, the accounting change method and the distribution method. Among 
them the discretionary accruals method is most widely used by researchers as the 
proxy for earnings management. The main task of this method is to effectively 
separate the discretionary part from the total accruals (Hribar and Collins 2002). As 
Teoh et al. (1999) point out, due to imperfections in the models used to identify 
discretionary accruals, the discretionary accrual proxy can be noisy, regardless of the 
model used. However, under most circumstances, discretionary accruals are the most 
effective proxies for earnings management. This is the method employed in this study. 
Discretionary accruals are used to reflect earnings management. REITs calculate net 
income using GAAP, just as other non-REIT companies. Therefore, the discretionary 
accruals methods developed in the broader literature for non-REITs are also 
applicable to REITs. 
There are five time-series models of discretionary accruals in the literature: the 
DeAngelo (1986) model, the Healy (1985) model, the industry model used in Dechow 
and Sloan (1991), the Jones (1991) model and the modified Jones model (Dechow et 
al. 1995). Among these only the Jones and modified-Jones models are most frequently 
used. This time-series approach is actually a variation of the event study method. 
However, a limitation of this approach is that a minimum of several consecutive years 
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of data prior to event dates are required to determine the normal pattern of accruals for 
a specific firm. It is difficult to find such a clean period for REITs because of the high 
SEO frequency in this industry. This would dramatically reduce the sample size. 
Another concern about this model is the possible survivorship bias in sample selection.  
Some researchers improve this model by introducing several cross-sectional 
versions of the Jones model. Cross-sectional versions of the Jones model are 
estimated using data from firms matched on time and industry. These cross-sectional 
models have replaced the original time-series models in recent applications (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996; Teoh et al. 1998; DuCharme et al. 2004). 
Their findings demonstrate that the cross-sectional Jones model is no worse than 
time-series models such as the Jones model and modified Jones model. Moreover, 
cross-sectional method has less strict requirements for the historical data availability 
of sample firms and higher precision of the estimates (Kothari, 2001). The 
cross-section discretionary accruals model is therefore used in this study. 
The intuition behind the discretionary accruals method is that accruals can be 
decomposed into two parts: discretionary and nondiscretionary. Nondiscretionary part 
is determined by external economic environment and industrial-specific situations, 
which are not controlled by REIT managers. What managers can influence is the 
discretionary part, that is, earnings management. Managers can exercise their 
discretion over accounting methods and accounting estimates related to discretionary 
accruals as well as over the timing of recognizing these accruals. According to the 
specific accruals being examined, the discretionary accruals method can be further 
differentiated into two methods. The first method is discretionary total accruals 
method (DTA) where total accruals (TA) are examined. The second is discretionary 
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working capital accruals method (DWA) where the working capital accruals (WA) are 
analyzed. Both methods are used in this study. DTA and DWA are the two measures of 
earnings management.  
3.1.1 Cross-sectional Modified Jones Model 
As shown in Equation (3.1) and (3.2), two independent variables are introduced 
in the Jones model to control for the changes in unmanaged accruals caused by 
external economic environment. Changes in revenue ( rev∆ ) capture the change in 
working capital and the level of gross plant, property and equipment (gppe) is used to 
control for depreciation expenses. In this model, the implicit assumption is that 
revenues are nondiscretionary and difficult for managers to manipulate. This 
assumption makes the problem easier to analyze, however, it is not always the case in 
practice. As Jones recognizes5, reported revenues may be affected to some extent by 
managers. For example, managers may control the timing of revenue recognition. If 
managers do manipulate earnings through the discretionary part of the revenues, the 
discretionary accruals level calculated from this model would be biased toward zero.  
Dechow et al. (1995) make an improvement to the original Jones model by 
correcting its assumption about revenues manipulation. In calculating discretionary 
accruals, the changes in receivables ( rec∆ ) are deducted from changes in revenues. 
This modified model implicitly assumes that all the changes in accounts receivables 
are caused by earnings management. Dechow et al. (2003) review this issue and state 
that on average a $100 change in sales will result in a $7 increase in accounts 
receivable, which means 93% of changes in receivables are discretionary, thus the 
method used in the modified Jones model is basically justified. Another paper about 
                                                        
5
 See Footnote 31 in Jones (1991) 
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specific accruals find that accounting receivables of equity issuers are extremely high 
(Marquardt and Wiedman 2004), which also makes it reasonable to take changes in 
receivables as discretionary accruals. In this study, the cross-sectional modified Jones 
model is used to calculate DTA. 
For non-offering REITs in the same quarter, total accruals are regressed on 
Change in revenue ( rev∆ ) and Gross plant, property and equipment (gppe), as shown 
in Equation (3.1). These two independent variables are introduced to control for 
changes in working capital and depreciation expenses respectively. By doing so, the 
normal level of nondiscretionary accruals for the industry in certain quarter can be 
identified. The estimated coefficients from the non-offering REITs regression are then 
used in Equation (3.2) to estimate DTA of offering-REITs by subtracting the estimated 
nondiscretionary accruals from total accruals. Following Dechow et al. (1995) and 
Rangan (1998), rev∆ is adjusted by subtracting Change in receivables ( rec∆ ) in an 
attempt to remove the effects of managerial discretion over credit sales. Discretionary 
working capital accruals (DWA) can be estimated in the similar way as shown in 
Equation (3.3) and (3.4). 
3.1.2 Working Capital Accruals Model 
There is another stream of earnings management literature using an alternative 
discretionary accruals method initiated by Teoh et al. (1998). In contrast to the 
discretionary total accruals method explained above, only working capital accruals are 
analyzed in this method. Teoh’s model follows the same rationale as Jones model. As 
shown in Equation (3.3), working capital accruals are regressed on changes in 
revenues ( rev∆ ) for all non-offering REITs in the same quarter. The relation indicated 
by the coefficients can be seen as an industry standard for accruals. These coefficients 
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from non-offering REITs are then used in Equation (3.4) to calculate discretionary 
working capital accruals. Rangan (1998) modifies the model by introducing changes 
in cost of goods sold ( cogs∆ ) as an additional explanatory variable. However, to avoid 
potential multicollinearity problem6, only changes in revenue are used in the study. 
In the four papers on earnings management around SEOs, Rangan (1998) and 
Teoh et al. (1998b) examine DWA while Shivakumar (2000) and Kim and Park (2005) 
use DTA to measure earnings management. Teoh et al. (1998) states that managers 
have more discretion over current accruals than over long-term accruals, therefore the 
discretionary component of working capital accruals (DWA) may be a better proxy 
than that of total accruals (DTA)7. However, given that depreciation is a dominant 
component in the costs of REITs, excluding depreciation from the analysis of earnings 
management may result in a loss of information. Therefore, both total accruals and 
working capital accruals are examined in this study. Any different conclusions about 
earnings management for the two models would mean that depreciation expenses 
should account for the difference. 
                                                        
6
 It is found that changes in revenue and changes in COGS are highly correlated for the sample REITs which may 
be caused by the feature of this REIT industry that both revenues and expenses are related to the same set of 
properties. 
7
 Working capital accruals are defined as the sum of changes in receivables, inventory and other current assets less 
the sum of changes in accounts payable, income taxes and other current liabilities. Total accruals equal working 
capital accruals less depreciation. 
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3.1.3 Model Settings 
The two discretionary accruals models used in this study are listed below: 
Modified Jones Model: 
 
1 1 1 2 1 3 1/ (1/ ) ( / ) ( / )it it it it it it it iTA a a rev a gppe aβ β β ε− − − −= + ∆ + +                 (3.1) 
 
1 1 1 2 1 1 3 1/ (1/ ) ( / / ) ( / )it it it it it it it it it itDTA TA a b a b rev a rec a b gppe a− − − − −= − − ∆ − ∆ −   (3.2) 
Working Capital Accruals Model: 
1 1 1 2 1/ (1/ ) ( / )it it it it it iWA a a rev aβ β ε− − −= + ∆ +                              (3.3) 
1 1 1 2 1 1/ (1/ ) ( / / )it it it it it it it itDWA TA a b a b rev a rec a− − − −= − − ∆ − ∆                (3.4)             
The meanings of the parameters are: 
Table 3. 1 Definition of variables in DA models 
itTA  total actual accruals of firm i during quarter t; 
itWA  working capital accruals of firm i during quarter t; 
itDTA  discretionary total accruals of firm i during quarter t; 
itDWA  discretionary working capital accruals of firm i during quarter t; 
itrev∆  change in revenue from quarter t-1 to quarter t; 
itrec∆  change in accounts receivables from quarter t-1 to quarter t; 
itgppe  Gross property, plant and equipment at the end of quarter t; 
1ita −  total assets at the end of quarter t-1
8
 
Source: Author, 2007 
 
Hribar and Collins (2002) suggest that discretionary accruals estimated from 
balance sheet data may be biased and they find that discretionary current accruals 
estimated from cash flow statements are lower than those estimated from balance 
sheet data for a sample of SEOs. As such, cash flow statements are used to calculate 
                                                        
8 Scaling the variables with the total assets of previous quarters a weighted least squares (WLS) approach 
aimed at addressing the potential heteroedasticity problems associated with the disturbance terms in the regression.  
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discretionary accruals in the study. 
Table 3. 2 Calculation method and data items in Compustat Manuals 
 
Quarterly Data Item   Data Item # 
+  Income Before Extraordinary Items 76 
+  Depreciation and Amortization 77 
+  Extraordinary Items and Discontinued Operations 78 
+  Deferred Taxes 79 
+  Equity in Net Loss (Earnings) 80 
+  Sale of Property, Plant, and Equipment and Sale of Investments-Loss 
(Gain) 102 
+  Funds from Operations – Other 81 
+  Accounts Receivable – Decrease (Increase) 103 
+  Inventory – Decrease (Increase) 104 
+  Accounts Payable and Accrued Liabilities – Increase (Decrease) 105 
+  Income Taxes – Accrued – Increase (Decrease) 106 
+  Assets and Liabilities – Other (Net Change) 107 
=  Operating Activities Net Cash Flow 108 
Source: Compustat, 2007 
 
By definition, working capital accruals equal the sum of changes in receivables, 
inventory and other current assets less the sum of changes in accounts payable, 
income taxes and other current liabilities. Total accruals equal working capital 
accruals less depreciation. Shivakumar (2000) uses a direct way to calculate total 
accruals9. At the same time, an indirect method can be induced from the equation 
relationship shown in the table above10. All the data in this equation can be found in 
Compustat database. Both these two methods are used to calculate total accruals. It is 
found that two set of results are largely the same, but results of the indirect method are 
finally reported. It has less missing values and hence would provide better data 
quality. 
                                                        
9 In Shivakumar (2000), the total accruals equal #105+#106–#103-#104-#107-#77 and the working capital 
accruals equal #105+#106–#103-#104-#107. 
10 In the indirect method, the total accruals are defined as #76+ #78+ #79+ #80+ #81+ #102- #108 and the 
working capital accruals equal  #76+#77+ #78+ #79+ #80+ #81#102- #108 
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In original Jones model settings, the independent variable PPE is supposed to be 
the total book value of the gross property, plant and equipment. However, due to the 
unique characteristic of the REIT industry, there are many missing values in this 
particular account in the Compustat Database, at the same time, in the REIT industry, 
real estate properties are actually treated as long term investments which are not 
included in the PPE account. In order to capture the effect of depreciation and 
amortization, the account of other assets (Compustat Quarterly data item #43) is used 
as a proxy. In quarterly balance sheets, this item #43 equals the sum of long term 
investments, goodwill, other intangibles, and other long term assets. It is believed to 
be able to reflect the depreciation and amortization of REITs.  
Moreover, definitions of some variables in the equations are different in the 
REIT context. For example, according to Compustat user manuals, the account cost of 
goods sold means total operating costs for non-manufacturing firms such as REITs. 
Therefore, the variable COGS in the above equations stands for operating expenses of 
REITs. 
3.2 Measuring Manipulation of FFO 
NAREIT published a White Paper in 1991 to give a formal definition to FFO and 
has updated the White Paper several times ever since. In its White Paper in 2001, 
NAREIT provided best practices disclosure models in order to advocate consistency 
in reporting. By definition, calculating FFO begins with earnings calculated in 
accordance with GAAP. These earnings are then adjusted to exclude gains or losses 
resulting from the sale of portfolio properties or from debt or financing activities. 
Then depreciation and amortization charges are added back to the resulting number to 
get FFO. However, because REITs have no legal obligation to follow NAREIT 
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guidelines, there is still much scope for FFO manipulation.  
 
Table 3. 3 Definition of FFO given by NAREIT 
 
 Net Income (GAAP) 
- Gains(Losses) from sales of property 
+ Depreciation and amortization 
+ 
Adjustments for unconsolidated 
interests 
= Funds From Operations 
 
Source: NAREIT, 2007 
Although FFO is widely regarded as a better measure of performance than 
GAAP earnings, there are some concerns about its exposure to manipulation. As 
Fields et al. (1998) and Vincent (1999) point out, FFO is a non-GAAP measure whose 
calculation and presentation is not subject to consistency rules or outstanding audits. 
Additionally, many REITs do not provide sufficient information about how FFO is 
calculated. Without legal obligations to follow NAREIT guidelines, REITs managers 
have substantial discretion to decide which items are included or excluded when 
calculating FFO. The fact that FFO is not calculated consistently across REITs is 
considered the main reason why it can be manipulated. NAREIT also states that the 
measure of FFO is not a static definition and might change from time to time to 
address relevant changes in accounting standards, SEC rules and regulations and 
periodic best practices review. 
To better reflect cash profitability, many REITs also report adjusted FFO (AFFO), 
cash available for distribution (CAD), or funds available for distribution (FAD). None 
of these figures is standardized, and many REITs define them differently. Report users 
need to consider the details each company provides and judge by themselves how 
closely those details mirror the company's operation. Some of the more common 
items rolled into AFFO, CAD and FAD include recurring capital expenditures, 
straight-line rental income, tenant improvements, and leasing commissions. All of 
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these items are different under accrual accounting. If adjusted for, they'll decrease 
FFO in most cases, but to different extent. 
 To measure FFO manipulation, the definition given by NAREIT is used as a 
best practice standard in this study. The difference between the FFO actually released 
in financial reports and the FFO calculated according to the NAREIT definition can 
be used as a proxy for the manipulation of FFO (Zhu 2006). The difference between 
these two figures is caused by certain adjustments up to managerial discretion. 
Following Gore and Stott (1998), FFO is calculated from financial statement variables 
in accordance with the NAREIT definition11. The different between this expected 
value and the actual value released in financial reports is termed as the variable 
DIF12.DIF is used in the study as a proxy for manipulation of FFO.  
To make it comparable to DTA or DWA, the two measures of earnings 
management discussed before, DIF is scaled by total assets and market value at the 
beginning of the quarter, generating new variables DIFA and DIFMV respectively. 
These two variables are used to measure FFO manipulation in the rest of this thesis. 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 3 mainly discusses how to measure manipulation in REITs’ financial 
results. In the REIT industry, there are two performance measures both closely 
monitored: GAAP earnings and FFO. At the same time, they provide two channels for 
managers to manipulate financial performance.  
To manage GAAP earnings, they can make use of discretionary accruals: 
                                                        
11
 FFO equals Income before extraordinary items available to common shareholders (#25) plus Minority interests 
(#3) plus Depreciation and Amortization of real estate property (#272) minus Gain/Loss from sales of real estate 
property (#271)11. 
12
 In calculating DIF, both expected FFO and actual FFO are scaled by total assets or market value and the 
beginning of the quarter. Therefore there are two scaled DIFs in this study, DIFA and DIFMV respectively. 
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discretionary total accruals (DTA) and discretionary working capital accruals (DWA). 
Modified Jones’ model and Teoh’s model are used to capture these two discretionary 
accruals. 
To manipulate FFO, managers can exercise their discretion in calculating FFO. 
In this study, the difference (DIF) between defined FFO and actual FFO is used as a 












                                                        
13
 In this study, the difference between actual FFO and expected FFO is used as a proxy for manipulation of FFO. 
This best guess is a practical choice because many REITs do not release all the details of FFO calculation in their 
financial statements. However, it might cause some potential bias. This problem will be discussed in Section 5.3.. 
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Chapter 4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Description 
The REITs sample as well as REIT names, exchange tickers and business sectors 
come from the NAREIT. All mortgage and hybrid REITs are dropped from the sample. 
To keep the fiscal year matched with the calendar year, REITs whose end month of 
the fiscal year is not December are dropped. Excluding those without qualified data 
series results a sample of 140 REITs.  
 
Table 4. 1 Summary of the property sector distribution 
Property Sector Numbers Percentage 
   Industrial/Office 36  25.71% 
          Office 23   
          Industrial 6   
          Mixed 7    
   Retail 31  22.14% 
          Shopping Centers 17   
          Regional Malls 9   
          Free Standing 5    
   Residential 26  18.57% 
          Apartments 21   
          Manufactured Homes 5    
   Others 47  33.57% 
         Diversified 12   
         Lodging/Resorts 16   
         Self Storage 5   
         Health Care 11   
         Specialty 3    
Total 140   
          Source: NAREIT, 2007 
All seasoned equity offerings data are from NAREIT. The sample contains 251 
SEOs from 90 REITs. The sample period is 2001Q1 through 2006Q4, a total of 24 
consecutive quarters. Quarterly financial results14 are selected from the Compustat 
                                                        
14
 In Compustat Database, the quarterly financial data in Cash Flow Statement is reported on the Year-to-date 
pattern. The data are further processed to get the true quarterly data as needed. 
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Database. Dates when REITs first publicly announce their quarterly financial results 
are obtained from Compustat too. Information about external auditors comes from the 
Audit Analytics Database. The institutional investors holding ratios are collected from 
Thomson Financial Ownership Database. FFO data actually released are collected 
from 10-Q/10-K reports in SEC’s EDGAR system.  
Fig 4. 1 A summary of SEOs from different sectors 











Source: NAREIT, 2006 
 
Fig 4. 2 Amount of REIT SEOs in the US 
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Fig 4. 3 Frequency of REIT SEOs in the US 
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Source: NAREIT, 2007 
 
One possible concern about this study may be related to the sample period it 
covers. The SEO frequency discussed above is measured by the number of SEOs 
during the sample period of 2001-2006. Equity offerings during a 6-year period may 
not fully capture the whole landscape. In fact, this period is an intended choice. 
Capital markets in the US experienced significant changes during the period of 
1999-2000 when the turmoil in capital markets tremendously reduced the number of 
SEOs over that period. This structural change in the whole market also affects equity 
offerings in the REIT industry. As can be seen in the figure below, the number of 
SEOs in year 2000 is unusually small. This break in offerings can serve as a firewall 
and help to virtually separate the sample period from previous periods. SEO history in 
the past will not affect the analysis of SEOs in the new current period. 
Before 2001, another important event in the REIT industry is the REIT 
Modernization Act of 1999. Its provisions allow a REIT to own up to 100% of stock 
of a taxable REIT subsidiary that can provide services to REIT tenants and others. The 
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law also changed the minimum distribution requirement from 95 percent to 90 percent 
of a REIT's taxable income. Taken together, it is reasonable to believe that significant 
changes have taken place in the REIT industry over the period of 1999-2000 and have 
probably altered industry fundamentals. This also justified the choice of starting the 
sample period from 2001.  
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Source: NAREIT, 2007 
 

















Source: Author, 2007 
 
Fig4.5 above demonstrates the distribution of DIFA. As can be seen in the figure, 
most DIFA variables are closely bigger than zero. As a common practice in the REIT 
industry, REIT managers do not have to calculate FFO strictly according to the 
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definition given by NAREIT and hence have enough scope to exert their discretion 
during the process. 
4.2 Testing Specific Event: Univariate Analysis 
This study first analyzes changes in earnings management (DTA, DWA) and 
FFO manipulation (DIF) around SEOs. In previous research about earnings 
management around equity offerings (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998b; Shivakumar 
2000; Kim and Park 2005), frequent issuers which have more than one public 
offerings of seasoned common stock in two years are usually excluded from the 
analysis. Dechow et al. (1996) state that frequent issues will report their financial 
results more conservatively in order to create a positive reputation in the market, from 
which they can benefit in subsequent offerings.  
Due to the high payout requirement (90% of taxable earnings), REITs rely 
heavily on external capital to finance their investments and expansions. Therefore, the 
frequency for REITs to raise capital in public market is higher than that in other 
industries (Li, et al. 2006). The graph below demonstrates the SEO frequency of 
REITs in the sample. During the 24 quarters covered in this study, most REITs have 
1-6 times seasoned equity offerings. However, some REITs go to capital market much 
more frequently. An extreme example is the REIT which has ten SEOs over the 
24-quarter period. 
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Source: NAREIT, 2007 
 
4.2.1 Earnings Management around SEOs  
Hypothesis 1 is to test whether earnings management exists around SEOs in the 
REIT industry. In this analysis, Quarter -1 is defined as the quarter for which the latest 
financial reports are available when the equity offering announcement is made. All 
other quarters are coded relative to this quarter. Financial results reported for Quarter 
-1 are most susceptible to earnings management. It is natural to expect that earnings 
management will continue for several quarters because this will make the 
manipulation smoother and more difficult to detect. Therefore, the quarters around 
offering announcement are most susceptible candidate for earnings management 
(Rangan, 1998). The Wilcoxon signed-rank and t-value tests are used to decide 
whether the manipulation of earnings (through DTA and DWA) and FFO (through 
DIFA and DIFMV) around the event quarter are significantly larger than 0.  
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Source: Author, 2007 
 
In the figure above is the distribution of manipulation for REITs with only one 
SEO. Considering the high SEO frequency in the REIT industry, this restricted sample 
definitely can not represent the general characteristics of the whole industry. This is 
the extreme case which is even more restrictive than that discussed in previous studies 
such as Dechow et al. (1996) and Shivakumar (2000) which focus on general stocks 
rather than REITs. In their studies, only frequent issuers having two or more public 
offerings within two years are excluded. It means SEOs that have a long interval since 
the previous one can still be included in the analysis. Next, this restriction will be 
relaxed step by step. Namely, REITs with more than one SEO will be added into the 
analysis subsequently.  
This analysis of earnings management around SEOs is divided into three cases. 
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In Case 1, REITs with only one SEO during the sample period are included, that is, 
REITs with more than one SEO are dropped. In Case 2, only SEOs that are less than 
one year from the previous SEO are dropped from the original sample. Compared 
with Case 1, SEOs that are more than one year after that REIT’s previous SEOs are 
added into the analysis. This is the situation that keeps comparability with previous 
studies on general stocks. In Case 3, all SEOs in the sample are taken into 
consideration. The distribution of earnings management in these three cases is 
demonstrated in Fig 4. 7, Fig 4. 8 and Fig 4. 9. 




Source: Author, 2007 
As can be seen in these three figures, the four measures of financial manipulation 
(DTA, DWA, DIFA and DIFMV) all become higher prior to quarter 0, indicating that 
financial results are boosted higher before SEOs, especially in quarter -2 and -1. 
However, although this trend is relatively clear in these figures, not all measures in the 
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earning management, the Signrank and T-value tests are used to examine whether the 
four measures are larger than zero and the results are listed in Table 4. 2.  
All the four measures are not statistically significant in Case 1. In Case 2, 
restrictions are relaxed by adding into analysis SEOs at least one year later from 
previous ones. In other words, SEOs too close to the REIT’s previous equity offerings 
are dropped from the analysis. Distribution of earnings management in both Case 1 
and 2 is demonstrated in the same graph as shown in Fig 4. 8. Distribution patterns of 
earnings management are similar in both cases, however, manipulation of FFO (DIFA 
and DIFMV) are generally higher in Case 2 than in Case 1, but not for discretionary 
accruals measures (DTA and DWA), which reflect the potential impact SEO frequency 
has on earnings management practices. In Case 2, the Signrank test shows that 
manipulation of FFO are all significantly positive in the five quarters around SEOs, 
while T-test indicates that DIF is statistically positive in the two quarters immediately 
prior to SEOs. These results provide evidence that there is FFO manipulation around 
REIT SEOs. In contrast, the same tests for DTA and DWA have only one statistically 
significant result and the other p-values are only at 10-15% level. These findings are 
supportive to Hypothesis 1 that financial results are managed around SEOs. 
Case 2 is comparable to previous studies on earnings management issues because 
the same restriction on SEO samples is applied. This result is weaker than that of 
general stocks examined by Shivakumar (2000) and Rangan (1998). Even though the 
same method is used to calculate DTA, the p-values of Signrank tests in Shivakumar’s 
study are nearly 0 in all the eight quarters around offering announcement. Moreover, 
the median of DTA in the sample is lower and less statistically significant. It is the 
same when comparing the DWA result with that in Rangan (1998). Small sample size 
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may be one explanation for this difference. Another possible explanation is that 
discretionary accruals are less obvious in the REIT industry than in other industries. 
Testing results of earnings management in REITs (DTA and DWA) are weaker than in 
general stocks, however, the results of FFO manipulation (DIF) are significant. The 
Signrank test shows that FFO manipulation is all significantly positive in the five 
quarters around SEOs, indicating that more manipulation in the REIT industry is 
achieved by using discretion in calculating FFO. 






-3 -2 -1 0 1 2  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 
Case 1 
DIFA 0.68  0.51  0.28  0.65  0.52  0.90   0.82  0.82  0.92  0.88  0.83  0.83  
DIFMV 0.49  0.42  0.24  0.76  0.41  0.85   0.83  0.76  0.92  0.88  0.83  0.83  
DTA 0.56  0.32  0.27  0.43  0.11  0.92   0.11  0.73  0.20  0.58  0.25  0.99  
DWA 0.33  0.38  0.24  0.79  0.23  0.91   0.79  0.85  0.27  0.85  0.75  0.94  
Case 2 
DIFA 0.59  0.02  0.01  0.70  0.30  0.41   0.02  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.00  
DIFMV 0.55  0.06  0.02  0.67  0.24  0.41   0.01  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.00  
DTA 0.66  0.12  0.15  0.39  0.18  0.23   0.39  0.19  0.16  0.28  0.54  0.30  
DWA 0.90  0.07  0.11  0.51  0.83  0.43   0.86  0.24  0.38  0.66  0.91  0.26  
Case 3 
DIFA 0.64  0.00  0.00  0.32  0.47  0.04   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
DIFMV 0.54  0.00  0.02  0.40  0.25  0.02   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
DTA 0.73  0.03  0.09  0.16  0.13  0.17   0.22  0.20  0.26  0.28  0.30  0.23  
DWA 0.91  0.02  0.31  0.68  0.89  0.62   0.67  0.31  0.50  0.41  0.88  0.11  
Source: Author, 2008 
 
 
Table 4. 3 Comparison between the results in Case 2 and those in other papers 
p-value -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 
DTA in this study 0.39 0.19 0.16 0.28 0.54 0.30 
DTA in Shivakumar(2000) 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DWA in this study 0.86 0.24 0.38 0.66 0.91 0.26 
DWA in Rangan(1998) 0.37 0.29 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.29 
    
  
 
Source: Author, 2008; Shivakumar (2000) and Rangan (1998) 
 
In Case 3, restrictions are furthered relaxed so that all SEOs in the sample are 
taken in consideration. REITs with more than one SEO will also be taken into account 
in the analysis. Distribution of earnings management in Case 1 and Case 3 is 
combined in the same graph. The trends in manipulation found in the previous two 
cases remain in Case 3. An interesting finding is that in Case 3 earnings management 
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measured by DTA or DWA remains weakly significant and does not change much 
from Case 1. In contrast, DIFA and DIFMV are higher in Case 3 than in Case 1, 
additionally, statistical tests reveal that FFO manipulation (DIF) is significantly 
positive in all the five quarters around SEOs. Moreover, as shown in Table 4. 2, 
p-values in this case are even lower (more significant) than those in Case 2. In sum, 
results in Case 3 are supportive to previous findings that there is FFO manipulation 
around SEOs. Meanwhile, evidence for earnings management (DTA and DWA) is 
stronger than in Case 2 where only one quarter is significant. In Case 3, earnings 
management measures DTA and DWA are significantly positive in the two quarters 
before SEOs. In a word, evidence of earnings management becomes clearer when all 
SEOs are considered. As such, the hypothesis about manipulation of earnings and 
FFO is supported. REITs do manipulate their financial results around SEOs. 

















































4.2.2 Earnings Management and Issuing Frequency 
Based on the above analysis of frequent issuers, it is found that earnings 
management in the REIT industry associates with the equity offering frequency of 
REITs. As demonstrated in the three figures above, compared with Case 1 where only 
REITs with one SEO during the sample period are considered, when frequent issuers 
are added into the analysis, average DIF becomes higher while DTA and DWA are 
relatively lower. Frequent issuers tend to have higher FFO manipulation, while no 
clear increase is found in discretionary accruals. It is expected that REITs that issue 
equity more often would exert more manipulation of FFO instead of using 
discretionary accruals to boost reported financial results.   
4.2.2.1 Testing Hypothesis 2 
To test Hypothesis 2 and further investigate the relation between manipulation 
and issuing frequency, all REITs with SEOs are separated into 3 groups according to 
their SEO times during the sample period. Namely, Group 1 contains REITs with 1-3 
SEOs. Group 2 contains REITs with 4-6 SEOs. REITs with more than 6 SEOs are 
included into Group 3. The relation between manipulation and SEO frequency is 
demonstrated in the figure below. Both mean and median of earnings management are 
provided. Additionally, REITs with no SEOs are also considered in this case. 
As shown in the figure below, as offering frequency increases, manipulation of 
FFO increases while discretionary accruals are largely on the decline. The four 
manipulation measures used in the graph above are means of earnings management 
over the three quarters (-3 through -1). An ANOVA test is used to compare DIFA, 
DIFMV, DTA and DWA among these three different groups. DIFA and DTA among 
these three groups are significantly different. 
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Fig 4. 10 Earnings Management and SEO Frequency 






























Source: Author, 2008 
 
Table 4. 4 ANOVA of different SEO frequency groups 
 
ANOVA DIFA DIFMV DTA DWA 
F-value 2.59 1.59 3.76 1.03 
p-value 0.08  0.21  0.02  0.36  
Source: Author, 2008 
 
Fig 4. 11 SEO frequency and manipulation 











Source: Author, 2008 
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As shown in the figures above, frequent SEO issuers tend to have less 
management in earnings through discretionary accruals and more manipulation of 
FFO through DIF. This is related to the characteristics of accruals and FFO. Accruals 
under managers’ discretion are limited because certain accruals will offset across 
different accounting periods. This is related to the reversing characteristic of accruals 
(Sloan, 1996). For instance, increase in account receivables can increase revenue 
during the current period but this accrual will finally decrease when the payment is 
actually made. Chan et al. (2004) find that earnings management causes the negative 
relationship between current accruals and future earnings. Current accruals will be 
reversed with the decrease in future earnings in the next one and three years. But 
those adjustment accounts used to calculate FFO do not have these limitations and 
give managers more flexibility to exert their discretion on the reported figures. 
At the same time, accounting practices in accruals are strictly ruled by GAAP, 
which makes it difficult for managers to continuously boost earnings over a long time. 
In contrast, FFO is just an industry-specific measure that NAREIT recommends its 
members to use. Although NAREIT has published several White Papers to clarify and 
formalize the calculation method of FFO, there is still enough scope for manipulation. 
FFO is not calculated consistently across REITs and is not reconciled to net income 
by many REITs (Vincent 1999). Without legal obligations to follow NAREIT 
guidelines, REITs managers have substantial discretion over what adjustment to make 
when calculating FFO. In summary, REITs that issue SEO more frequently have more 
manipulation of FFO and less earnings management. Therefore Hypothesis 2 is not 
completely supported. This conclusion is achieved by comparing the average level of 
manipulation in certain group of REITs. To test for the robustness of this analysis, 
several other relevant issues are addressed below. 
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4.2.3 Robustness Discussions 
4.2.3.1 SEO Sequence 
For REITs with multiple SEOs, FFO manipulation on average is relatively higher 
than REITs with only one SEO; meanwhile, average earnings management of these 
multi-issuers is relatively lower. This conclusion is based upon the average 
manipulation in different SEO frequency groups as shown in Fig 4. 10.  
To test the robustness of this argument, SEOs from multi-offering REITs are 
divided into different groups. For multi-offering REITs, their first SEOs during the 
period are included into one group and all the subsequent ones into another. Each of 
these two groups is compared with REITs with only one SEO in the analysis, that is, 
Case 1 discussed above. Results indicate that for both first and subsequent SEOs of 
multi-offering REITs, earnings management is lower than REITs in Case 1 (with only 
one SEO) and FFO manipulation is higher15. This finding reinforces the conclusion 
about the relation between SEO frequency and financial results manipulation. 
Frequent issuers are more aggressive in manipulating FFO than in managing earnings, 
which is determined by the characteristic of accounting accruals and the regulatory 
environment in the REIT industry. 
                                                        
15
 As shown in the figure below, DWA for subsequent SEOs is significantly lower compared with other three 
gauges. This is related to the characteristic of working capital which goes up and down more frequently than other 
three indicators. This problem will be further discussed next. 
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Fig 4. 12 Sequence of SEOs for multi-issuers 
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Source: Author, 2008 
 
One question left unanswered is how the manipulation in a specific REIT 
changes over time. As shown in Fig 4. 13, for multi-offering REITs, first SEOs and 
subsequent SEOs are compared. Three out of the four measures of manipulation are 
higher for subsequent SEOs than first SEOs even though ANOVA testing results are 
not significant. As Dechow et al. (1996) suggest, managers of firms that require 
frequent external financing will report earnings conservatively to create a positive 
reputation in the market, from which they can benefit in subsequent offerings. 
Multi-offering REIT managers can reasonably anticipate subsequent SEOs and hence 
would choose to be less aggressive in manipulating financial results before the first 
batch of SEOs in order to give some leeway for subsequent offerings.  
However, the difference in manipulation between first and subsequent SEOs 
from multi-issuing REITs is not statistically significant. It means simply separating 
SEOs into two groups, as the method used above, can not effectively capture possible 
changes in manipulation choices. To address this problem, the relation between SEO 
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sequence and manipulation of financial results are examined. SEOs in the sample are 
categorized according to their sequence in the offering history of certain REIT. By 
doing so, the trend in manipulation as SEO frequency increases can be demonstrated. 
Fig 4. 14 SEO sequence and manipulation 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DTA DWA DIFA DIFMV
 
Source: Author, 2008 
Fig 4. 15 demonstrates how financial manipulation changes along with SEO 
sequence. To remove possible influence from extreme cases, REITs that issue SEO 
too often are all dropped from the analysis, that is, REITs with SEO frequency larger 
than 7 are ruled out. As SEO frequency increases, FFO manipulation (DIFA and 
DIFMV) is generally on the rise while earnings management (DTA and DWA) is 
declining. However, no clear trend in one direction has been found in the figure, 
which means the relation between SEO sequence and financial results manipulation is 
quite contextual and not conclusive. Results in this analysis are supportive to previous 
findings when testing Hypothesis 2. As SEO frequency increases, REITs are more 




4.2.3.2 SEO Interval 
Another factor affecting financial results manipulation is the interval between 
SEOs. As mentioned in the literature, if managers can anticipate future SEOs in the 
pipeline, they tend to be more conservative in current manipulation. One reasonable 
hypothesis is that a longer delay from previous SEOs would place less restriction on 
REIT managers when manipulating financial results because the influence from 
previous offerings becomes weaker over time. 
The variable used to capture this feature, interval, is defined as the difference in 
dates of two adjacent SEOs by the same REIT. In calculation, REITs with only one 
SEO are excluded. Similarly, for multi-offering REITs, their first SEOs during the 
sample period are no included. The remaining sample is divided into three groups 
according to the length of intervals. SEOs with interval length of less than one year is 
included into Group 1, SEOs with intervals longer than one year and shorter than two 
years fall into Group 2, the rest goes to Group 3.  
As shown in the figure below, all the four manipulation measures become higher 
as the length of intervals increases. The results indicate that both earnings 
management and FFO manipulation are positively correlated with the length of 
intervals between the two SEOs. A longer delay from previous SEOs can make 
managers more aggressive in manipulating financial results. Shorter intervals would 
induce managers to be more conservative. That explains why REITs with SEO 
intervals larger than 720 days would have so much earnings management. 
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Fig 4. 16 Manipulation and SEO interval 
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4.2.4 Regulatory Environment 
When examining the financial results manipulation in the REIT industry, it is far 
from enough to consider only equity offering-related factors, even though these 
characteristics are what make REITs different from other stocks. As SEO frequency 
and sequence issues discussed above can not fully posit how manipulation choices are 
affected, several other factors which may have effect on manipulation are discussed in 
this section as a supplement to previous discussions. In this additional section, 
changes in the regulatory environment in the US capital markets are considered. 
4.2.4.1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The regulatory environment in the US has dramatically changed during the past 
few years. Regulatory requirements in capital markets have been profoundly 
strengthened after a series of financial scandals in enterprise America. Scandals in 
famous companies such as Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems 
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and WorldCom cost investors billions of dollars when the share prices of the affected 
companies collapsed, dramatically damaged public confidence in the nation's 
securities markets. In response to these major corporate and accounting scandals, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted on July 30, 2002. Aimed at restoring public 
confidence in the nation's capital markets by, among other things, strengthening 
corporate accounting controls, the legislation enhanced standards for all U.S. public 
company boards, management, and public accounting firms. As such, one reasonable 
expectation is that internal control and corporate governance in the REIT industry are 
getting stronger and there would be less financial results manipulation. To verify this 
judgment, an additional question to be discussed is whether there is a structural 
change in financial manipulation caused by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
The SOX was enacted on July 30, 2002, which can be used as a break point. The 
whole sample period covered in this study can be separated into two sub periods: 
pre-SOX and past-SOX. Considering possible delay in the effect of this law on 
manipulation choices of REIT managers, another time point chosen to detect possible 
structural changes is Jan 1, 2003. Introducing a second break time point is to test the 
robustness of this. Therefore, a total of two scenarios are considered and the only 
difference between them is the break time point used to locate the possible structural 
change. 
The ANOVA test is applied in both scenarios. Echoing the multivariate analysis 
in latter part of this study, a total of three situations are considered. In the first two 
situations, manipulation in Q (-1) and Q (-3 through -1) is investigated respectively 
for REITs that have SEOs during the sample period. Presumably this restricted sample 
of REITs with SEOs can not provide an overall picture about earnings management 
 65
practices in the industry. As discussed before, REITs that issue equity frequently tend 
to be more aggressive in performance manipulation. Therefore, the restrictive effect of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act can somehow be offset by increasing SEOs. To address this 
bias, in the third situation, REITs without SEOs are added in an attempt to investigate 
whether the finding of the first two tests still holds if restrictions about equity 
offerings are removed. The results in the third situation would be more informative 
and reasonable. 
As the table below shows, the only four significant structural changes detected 
are all in FFO manipulation. Manipulation of FFO in Q (-1) has significantly changes 
since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act took effect. Even when all REITs, with or without SEOs, 
are taken into consideration, this result does not change. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act does not affect the FFO calculation directly, it has brought stricter internal control 
and disclosure requirement, which in turn make it even harder for REIT managers to 
manipulate FFO. In contrast, no such significant change in structure has been found in 
earnings management. It means that the extent of earnings management in the REIT 
industry was already relatively lower than in other industries even before the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This law has not brought a structural change to earnings 
management in the REIT industry, which remains at a relatively lower level.  
Table 4. 5 Testing for possible structural changes caused by SOX 
 
July 200216  Jan 2003 
  Q(-1) Q(-3 to -1) All  Q(-1) Q(-3 to -1) All 
DIFA 0.0345  0.8988  0.0060   0.0891  0.6390  0.0075 
DIFMV 0.0227  0.9566  0.0009   0.0625  0.4692  0.0001 
DTA 0.6829  0.1687  0.3477   0.5979  0.1016  0.4768 
DWA 0.8799  0.4364  0.6600   0.9132  0.3527  0.4537 
        
Source: Author, 2008 
No matter which break point is used in the analysis, the result remains 
                                                        
16
 This is the first break point of July 30, 2002, the date when the Sarbanes-Oxley was signed into effect. Break 
point 2 is Jan 1, 2003, assuming that there was a delay of five months before this law started to affect manipulation 
decisions. 
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unchanged. In both scenarios, the results reveal that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has 
significantly affected FFO manipulation and no significant structural change has been 
found in earnings management. As shown by previous results, earnings management 
in the REIT industry tends to be less significant and observable. It is understandable 
that stricter internal control measures brought by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act do not 
considerably change manipulation in GAAP earnings. Given the widely recognized 
transparency in the industry and strict monitoring from regulatory authorities, this 
type of manipulation has already been limited even before the Act came into force. In 
contrast, stronger control and monitoring have left less space for managers to exert 
their discretion over the calculation of FFO, which is much easier to manipulate 
before. As a result, there is less FFO manipulation after the introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In multivariate analysis, this finding will be further investigated 
with other influencing factors being controlled.  
4.2.4.2 Accounting Flexibility over Time 
A series of financial scandals in enterprise America prompted the authority to 
further enhance regulatory environment in the US. Regulatory requirements in capital 
markets have been profoundly strengthened. Along this trend in the whole market, the 
regulatory environment in the REIT industry has been intensified too. For instance, in 
order to help investors better understand and measure REITs performance; NAREIT 
has updated its guideline about the definition of FFO and its calculation method 
several times ever since 1991. With these developments, it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that regulation becomes stricter over time in the REIT industry, as a result, 
there would be less accounting flexibility left for managers to manipulate. 
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Fig 4. 17 Accounting flexibility over time for REITs 
 
Source: Author, 2008 
Following Becker et al. (1998), absolute values of financial results manipulation 
(DTA, DWA, DIFA, DIFMV) are used to measure accounting flexibility. It is 
demonstrated in the figure above (Fig 4. 17) how accounting flexibility in the REIT 
industry changes over the six years covered in this study.  
A clear declining trend can be found in DIFA and DIFMV since after 2002 while 
no clear trend can be found in earnings management (discretionary accruals). This is 
consistent with previous findings about the structural change in FFO manipulation 
caused by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. As NAREIT publishes more White Papers about 
how to calculate FFO, the definition becomes clearer and there is less flexibility in 
FFO calculation which is up to managerial discretion. At the same time, accounting 
flexibility in favor of earnings management remains largely the same and no clear 
change in trend is observable. 
4.2.5 Test Summary: Univariate Analysis 
When examining earnings management around specific events (SEOs), both 
univariate analysis and multivariate analysis are employed. Here is a summary of the 
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findings so far using the univariate method. 
It is found that REITs manipulate earnings and FFO around SEOs, but their 
earnings management is less obvious than general stocks. Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
REITs that issue SEO more frequently have more manipulation in FFO and less 
earnings management. Hypothesis 2 is supported if only earnings management is 
considered. Financial results manipulation in the REIT industry is different from other 
industries. 
Additionally, the robustness of the analysis above is further discussed. As 
regulatory environment in the industry and corporate government inside REITs get 
strengthened, it becomes more and more difficult for REIT managers to manipulate 
FFO. As a result, FFO manipulation is decreasing over time. Hypothesis 6 about the 
trend in financial results manipulation over time is partly supported.  
4.3 Testing Specific Event: Multivariate Analysis 
4.3.1 Variable Definition 
Based on the univariate analysis above, in this part, four multivariate regressions 
are used to examine how earnings management practices in the REIT industry are 
influenced by SEOs as well as other factors. Variables used in the analysis include 
financial features, governance arrangements, business types and time-related factors. 
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Definitions of the variables are given below. 
Table 4. 6 Definitions of variables in multivariate regression 
Variable Definition 
DTA discretionary total accruals, discretionary accruals from modified Jones model 
DWA discretionary working capital accruals, discretionary accruals from Teoh's model 
DIFA difference between the expected and actual FFO scaled by total assets at the beginning of 
current quarter 
DIFMV difference between the expected and actual FFO scaled by market value at the beginning 
of current quarter 
ROA return on assets, ROA = net income/total assets 
CFO cash flow from operation scaled by total assets at the beginning of current quarter 
CFOVOL volatility of CFO measured by standard deviation over sample period 
X_LAG lagged value of any variable  
AUDIT dummy variable, equals 1 for big four auditing firms and 0 otherwise 
LEV leverage ratio, LEV = total liability/total assets 
INSTI = ln (1+ih). The variable ih is the total holding ratio of the three biggest institutional investors in the quarter 
MB Market to book ratio 
WC Working capital scaled by total assets 
IBEI Income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets at the beginning of current 
quarter 
EXT Extraordinary items scaled by total revenue 
FCF Free cash flow scaled by total assets 
NOOP Non-operation income scaled by total revenue 
Q4 dummy variable, equals 1 if current quarter is the fourth quarter and 0 otherwise 
TIMESEQ time variable, all the 24 quarters from 2001Q1 through 2006Q4 are coded 1,2,…,24 
SIZE size of the firm, SIZE = ln (total assets) 
SEOAMT value amount of SEO scaled by total assets 
SECTOR Dummy variables for different REIT sectors, sectordum 1 to 5 stand for Industrial/Office, Lodging, Residential, Retail and Others respectively.  
SEO Dummy variables for different SEO frequency, seodum 1 stands for 1-3 SEOs, seodum 2 for 4-6 SEOs, seodum 3 for 7-10 SEOs. 
YEAR Dummy variables to control for different years. 
SOX Dummy variable to control for possible structural changes caused by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) enacted on July 30, 2002. SOX equals 1 if before this date and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Author, 2008 
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4.3.2 Model Settings 
In Equation (4.1) and Equation (4.2), attention is paid to manipulation in Quarter 
-1. By definition, Quarter -1 is defined as the quarter for which the latest financial 
reports are available when the equity offering announcement is made, therefore, 
financial results reported for Quarter -1 are most susceptible to earnings management. 
In Equation (4.1), the dependent variable DA stands for DTA and DWA in Quarter -1. 
Similarly, DIF stands for DIFA and DIFMV in Quarter -1 in Equation (4.2). The 
assumption is that managerial manipulation choices are affected by fundamental 
characteristics of the REIT in current and previous quarters. 
Meanwhile, it is expected that earnings management will continue for several 
quarters because that will make the manipulation smoother and more difficult to 
detect. Therefore, the quarters around offering announcement are also very susceptible 
candidate for earnings management (Rangan, 1998). In Equation (4.3), DEP on the 
left side of the equation represents mean of DA or DIF over the three quarters from 
Quarter -3 to Quarter -1. Average earnings management level over these three quarters 
should be more informative than that in Quarter -1 because maybe not all the 
manipulation is carried out in Quarter -1. Other independent variables are also 
averaged over these three quarters respectively.  
All the analysis above focuses on equity-offering REITs and their financial 
results manipulation. This might cause some bias of sample selection. To address this 
concern, in Equation (4.4), all REITs in the sample are considered, that is, REITs with 
or without SEOs during the sample period are all included in the analysis. DEP in the 
equation stands for all the four measures of financial results manipulation. This 
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equation is used to investigate whether the findings in the other three equations are 
changed if the sample is enlarged to non-offering REITs. This analysis can serve as a 
robustness test of previous findings about earnings management of REITs with SEOs; 
at the same time, it can capture the whole picture of financial results manipulation in 
the REIT industry by considering many other factors in addition to equity offerings. 
The four regression functions used in the analysis are listed below. 
Equation (4.1) 
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4.3.3 Main Findings 
4.3.3.1 Manipulation in Quarter -1 
Equation (4.1) and Equation (4.2) mainly focus on earnings management in 
Quarter -1. The results provided in Table 4. 7 through Table 4. 10 reveal that there are 
significant differences between discretionary accruals and FFO manipulation. These 
two tools of manipulation have different characteristics and should be discussed 
separately. 
Earnings management (DTA, DWA) is negatively related to their lagged values, 
that is, there is a mean-reversion trend in discretionary accruals. This result is 
consistent with Sloan (1996). In contrast, DIF is positively associated with its lagged 
value and there is no mean-reversion trend in FFO manipulation. This is probably the 
reason why earnings can not be consistently manipulated higher over a long period. 
However, manipulation of FFO is not subject to such restriction. 
Another finding is that discretionary accruals (DA) are negatively associated 
with external audit quality, indicating that more scrutiny helps reduce earnings 
management. Hypothesis 4 about external auditor quality is supported. Higher 
external auditor quality is associated with less earnings manipulation, but 
auditing-related factors have no direct effect on FFO manipulation. As for the 
expected negative effect of institutional holdings on earnings management, no clear 
evidence has been found in either DA or DIF. Hypothesis 5 about governance is not 
supported in this case. The negative relation between SEO frequency and earnings 
management is nearly not significant. Some of the coefficients are only statistically 
significant at a 10% level. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 about SEO frequency is only 
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weakly supported in these two regressions. 
In addition, most of the coefficients of SOX are weakly significant, indicating 
the possible structural change caused by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is not clear if only 
equity-issuing REITs are considered. Conclusions from the restricted sample can not 
provide an overall picture about earnings management practices in the industry. As 
discussed before, REITs that issue equity frequently tend to be more aggressive in 
performance manipulation. The restrictive effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is 
somehow offset by increasing SEOs. Further investigation will be done in Equation 
(4.4), where REITs with or without SEOs are all considered and the results would be 
more informative and reasonable. 
Year dummy variables are most significant in Equation (4.1) but not in Equation 
(4.2), which means that the level of FFO manipulation in Quarter -1 does not change 
much from its level in Year 2001. In contrast, earnings management is generally lower 
than in 2001. It is found that earnings management in REITs is mainly associated with 
manipulation in previous periods and auditing factors. However, manipulation of FFO 
is positively correlated to free cash flow and working capital in the past quarter. If the 
financial health of a REIT in terms of operating cash flow gets worse, managers will 
be under more pressure and hence have stronger incentives to manipulate FFO. 
Deterioration in cash flows is one feature of possible manipulation of financial results. 
To sum up the findings in Equation (4.1) and (4.2), REITs with high external 
auditor quality and frequent SEO issuing have less earnings management. In contrast, 
REITs with deteriorating cash flow and frequent SEO have more FFO manipulation. 
The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is not obvious if only equity-issuing REITs are 
considered. 
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Table 4. 7 Regression results of earnings management (DTA) in Quarter -1 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
DTA_LAG -0.1924 -0.2175 -0.1691 -0.1675 -0.13 -0.1154 -0.1806 -0.2087 
 (2.48)** (3.13)*** (2.20)** (2.20)** (1.90)* (1.85)* (2.55)** (2.86)*** 
CFO_LAG 0.1077 0.0802 0.087 0.0626 0.1086 0.1144 0.0865 0.064 
 -1.58 -1.24 -1.28 -0.93 -1.62 (1.82)* -1.33 -0.97 
IBEI_LAG -0.0034 -0.0408 -0.0684 -0.0182 -0.0506 0.0067 0.0597 0.0014 
 -0.03 -0.39 -0.61 -0.16 -0.46 -0.06 -0.57 -0.01 
LEV_LAG -0.0054 -0.004 -0.0086 -0.0076 -0.0068 -0.004 -0.0019 -0.0049 
 -1.2 -1 (2.07)** (1.86)* (1.69)* -1.02 -0.48 -1.2 
NOOP_LAG 0.0049 0.0064 0.0062 0.0065 0.0085 0.0082 0.0075 0.0077 
 -0.62 -0.87 -0.78 -0.83 -0.99 -1.05 -1 -1.02 
EXT_LAG -0.0037 -0.0084 -0.0061 -0.0041 -0.0053 -0.0072 -0.0045 -0.006 
 -0.73 -1.64 -1.2 -0.81 -0.99 -1.47 -0.96 -1.22 
MB_LAB -0.0003 0.0017 0.0025 0.0013 0.0035 0.0032 0.0024 0.0008 
 -0.11 -0.72 -1.01 -0.57 -1.43 -1.35 -1.07 -0.32 
SIZE_LAG -0.0007 0 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0002 
 -1.21 -0.01 -0.51 -1.03 -0.12 -0.11 -0.84 -0.46 
INSTI_LAG 0.0041 0.0067 0.0013 0.0071 0.0038 0.0061 0.0086 0.0102 
 -0.57 -0.97 -0.18 -1.03 -0.48 -0.85 -1.29 -1.53 
AUDIT -0.0049 -0.0031 -0.0043 -0.0049 -0.0035 -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0031 
 (2.24)** -1.58 (1.88)* (2.29)** -1.44 -1.52 (1.66)* -1.49 
SEOAMT -0.0014 -0.0039 -0.0045 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.004 -0.0035 -0.0026 
 -0.23 -0.66 -0.72 -0.26 -0.23 -0.62 -0.56 -0.42 
INTERVAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 -0.36 -0.59 -0.35 -0.21 -0.23 -0.16 -0.19 -0.26 
Industrial/Office -0.001 0 0.0003 -0.0009    -0.001 
 -0.78 -0.03 -0.26 -0.73    -0.78 
Lodging -0.0031 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0034    -0.0036 
 (2.09)** -1.63 -1.13 (2.30)**    (2.55)** 
Residential -0.0025 -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0021    -0.0018 
 -1.39 -0.72 -0.39 -1.17    -1.03 
Retail 0.0003 0.0012 0.002 -0.0002    -0.0003 
 -0.26 -0.85 -1.37 -0.17    -0.19 
SOX -0.0026        
 (1.77)*        
4-6 SEOs  -0.0017 -0.0019  -0.0014 -0.0018   
  (1.76)* (1.77)*  -1.23 (1.78)*   
>6 SEOs  -0.0016 -0.0026  -0.0015 -0.0015   
  -1.11 (1.74)*  -0.96 -1.02   
Year 2002  -0.0078    -0.0079 -0.0079 -0.0078 
  (3.49)***    (3.25)*** (3.31)*** (3.27)*** 
Year 2003  -0.0051    -0.0059 -0.0054 -0.0053 
  (2.18)**    (2.38)** (2.23)** (2.12)** 
Year 2004  -0.0053    -0.0056 -0.0046 -0.0048 
  (2.30)**    (2.33)** (1.95)* (2.01)** 
Year 2005  -0.0034    -0.0048 -0.0042 -0.0039 
  -1.37    (1.90)* (1.70)* -1.54 
Year 2006  -0.0042    -0.0055 -0.0047 -0.0043 
  (1.69)*    (2.18)** (1.92)* (1.67)* 
Constant 0.0078 0.0049 0.0044 0.0061 -0.0005 0.0032 0.0038 0.0073 
 -1.54 -1 -0.89 -1.25 -0.1 -0.64 -0.79 -1.44 
Observations 149 146 149 150 150 150 148 149 
R-squared 0.27 0.37 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.28 0.28 0.32 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
Source: Author, 2008 
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Table 4. 8 Regression results of earnings management (DWA) in Quarter -1 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

















CFO_LAG 0.0585 0.013 0.0294 0.0392 0.0207 0.0106 0.0164 0.0295 
  -0.9 -0.2 -0.44 -0.6 -0.3 -0.17 -0.25 -0.47 
IBEI_LAG 0.0024 0.0173 -0.0295 -0.0369 -0.0549 0.0189 0.0035 0.0031 
  -0.02 -0.16 -0.25 -0.32 -0.5 -0.19 -0.03 -0.03 
LEV_LAG -0.0065 -0.0054 -0.0087 -0.0087 -0.0087 -0.0061 -0.0056 -0.0045 
  -1.48 -1.26 (2.00)** (2.04)** (2.22)** -1.57 -1.34 -1.07 
NOOP_LAG 0.0013 0.0057 0.0025 0.0024 0.0047 0.006 0.0057 0.0056 
  -0.16 -0.76 -0.32 -0.31 -0.57 -0.81 -0.73 -0.77 
EXT_LAG 0.002 0.0006 0.0007 0.0015 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0013 
  -0.4 -0.12 -0.13 -0.3 -0.25 -0.04 -0.12 -0.28 
MB_LAB 0.0007 0.003 0.0019 0.0012 0.0017 0.0024 0.0015 0.0022 
  -0.29 -1.21 -0.78 -0.5 -0.7 -1.04 -0.67 -0.95 
SIZE_LAG -0.0004 0.0001 0 -0.0001 0 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 
  -0.67 -0.21 -0.02 -0.27 -0.02 -0.22 -0.41 -0.13 
INSTI_LAG -0.0005 0.005 -0.002 0.0015 0.0017 0.006 0.0068 0.005 
  -0.07 -0.7 -0.26 -0.21 -0.22 -0.88 -0.95 -0.75 







(2.49)** (2.00)** (1.72)* (2.16)** 
SEOAMT -0.004 -0.0052 -0.0045 -0.0032 0.0003 -0.0042 -0.0003 -0.0036 
  -0.49 -0.64 -0.54 -0.38 -0.03 -0.53 -0.04 -0.44 
INTERVAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  -0.16 -0.34 -0.47 -0.68 -0.24 -0.32 -0.79 -0.27 
Industrial/Offic
e 
0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0002    0.0002 
  -0.29 -0.39 -0.46 -0.19       -0.17 
Lodging 0.001 0.0014 0.0014 0.0009    0.0011 
  -0.67 -0.99 -0.93 -0.62       -0.79 
Residential -0.0004 0.0001 0 -0.0004    -0.0004 
  -0.22 -0.04 -0.02 -0.24       -0.27 
Retail 0.0014 0.0008 0.0015 0.0011    0.0004 
  -1.1 -0.56 -1.07 -0.82       -0.33 
SOX -0.0025        
  (1.74)*               
4-6 SEOs  -0.0005 -0.0011  0.0002 -0.0003   
    -0.55 -1.05   -0.15 -0.28     
>6 SEOs  -0.0011 -0.0016  -0.0001 -0.0008   
    -0.77 -1.05   -0.1 -0.57     
Year 2002  -0.0101    -0.0102 -0.0099 -0.008 
    (3.91)**
* 






Year 2003  -0.007    -0.0072 -0.0069 -0.0046 
    (2.60)**       (2.78)**
* 
(2.47)** (1.96)* 
Year 2004  -0.0079    -0.008 -0.0075 -0.0054 
    (2.88)**
* 





Year 2005  -0.0067    -0.0068 -0.0052 -0.0042 
    (2.39)**       (2.50)** (1.83)* (1.72)* 
Year 2006  -0.0081    -0.0081 -0.0076 -0.0055 
    (2.82)**
* 





Constant 0.0049 0.0054 0.0031 0.0037 0.003 0.0068 0.0058 0.0044 
  -1 -1.08 -0.62 -0.75 -0.61 -1.45 -1.13 -0.88 
Observations 154 152 154 154 154 152 153 153 
R-squared 0.29 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.23 0.35 0.32 0.33 
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Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
Source: Author, 2008    
 
 
Table 4. 9 Regression results of FFO manipulation (DIFA) in Quarter -1 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 


















ROA_LAG -0.0212 -0.0124 -0.0156 -0.0255 -0.0232 -0.0056 -0.0156 -0.0233 
 -1.3 -0.66 -0.86 -1.53 -1.37 -0.33 -0.89 -1.39 
LEV_LAG -0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0008 0 -0.0005 -0.0013 
 (1.75)* -0.55 -1.02 (1.94)* -1.07 0 -0.72 -1.55 












MB_LAG 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 0.0005 0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 0.0005 
 -0.69 -0.92 -0.15 -1.08 -0.67 -0.27 -0.98 -1.08 
SIZE_LAG 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
 (1.78)* -0.47 -1.16 -1.4 -1.38 -0.69 -1.44 -1.42 
INSTI_LAG -0.0012 0.0033 0.0009 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0004 
 -0.84 (1.91)* -0.52 -0.33 -0.06 -0.08 -0.8 -0.28 
XP_LAG 0 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
 -0.03 -0.14 -0.09 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.1 -0.15 














SEOAMT 0.0011 0.0012 0.0009 0.001 0.001 0.0013 0.0008 0.0009 
 -0.81 -0.73 -0.6 -0.75 -0.66 -0.83 -0.56 -0.61 
INTERVAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 -0.55 (1.70)* -1.59 -0.97 -1.3 -1.44 -1.08 -0.91 
AUDIT 0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 
 -1.51 -0.99 -1.29 -1.4 -1.14 -0.85 -0.97 -1.32 
Industrial/Offic
e 
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001    -0.0002 
 -0.53 -0.27 -0.52 -0.28    -0.67 
Lodging -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003    -0.0003 
 -1.07 -0.27 -0.97 -0.94    -1.02 
Residential 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005    0.0006 
 (1.99)** -1.07 -1.07 -1.29    -1.58 
Retail 0 -0.0003 -0.0003 0    0 
 -0.17 -0.75 -0.75 -0.08    -0.12 
SOX -0.0006        
 (2.01)**        
4-6 SEOs  0.0003 0  -0.0001 0   
  -1.34 -0.06  -0.48 -0.06   
>6 SEOs  0.0009 0.0005  0.0003 0.0004   
  (2.48)** -1.45  -1.11 -1.32   
Year 2002  0.0003    0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 
  -0.37    -0.3 -0.35 -0.46 
Year 2003  0.0009    0.0012 0.0007 0.0006 
  -1.24    (1.69)* -1.25 -1.05 
Year 2004  0.0006    0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 
  -0.77    -1.04 -0.66 -0.54 
Year 2005  -0.0001    0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 
  -0.15    -0.45 -0.22 -0.18 
Year 2006  0.0003    0.0007 0.0002 0.0002 
  -0.37    -1 -0.42 -0.26 
Constant -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.001 -0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0013 
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 -0.85 -0.85 -0.74 -0.95 -1.17 -1.47 -1.55 -1.17 
Observations 147 149 149 147 148 146 147 148 
R-squared 0.47 0.37 0.35 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.44 0.47 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     




Table 4. 10 Regression results of FFO manipulation (DIFMV) in Quarter -1 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
DIFMV_LAG 0.2676 0.2354 0.231 0.2349 0.2307 0.2532 0.2314 0.2239 
  (5.07)*** (3.91)*** (4.12)*** (4.49)*** (4.45)*** (4.10)*** (4.31)*** (4.16)*** 
ROA_LAG 0.0141 0.001 -0.0091 0.0034 0 0.0076 0.0051 0.0013 
  -0.39 -0.03 -0.25 -0.09 0 -0.2 -0.13 -0.03 
LEV_LAG 0.001 0.001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0011 0.0005 0.0004 
  -0.51 -0.49 -0.33 -0.29 -0.44 -0.57 -0.3 -0.19 
FCF_LAG 0.005 0.0057 0.0045 0.0047 0.0047 0.0061 0.0046 0.0049 
  (2.89)*** (3.03)*** (2.61)** (2.61)** (2.83)*** (3.37)*** (2.51)** (2.53)** 
MB_LAG -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.001 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0005 
  -1.14 -0.77 -0.88 -0.92 -1.1 -1.11 -0.6 -0.42 
SIZE_LAG 0.0002 0 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0 0.0001 0.0001 
  -0.95 0 -0.59 -1 -0.85 -0.08 -0.5 -0.44 
INSTI_LAG -0.0007 0.0046 0.0028 0.0008 0.0018 0.0038 0.0001 0.0012 
  -0.23 -1.31 -0.83 -0.27 -0.54 -1.08 -0.04 -0.36 
XP_LAG -0.0007 0.0002 0 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.001 
  -0.43 -0.11 -0.03 -0.46 -0.42 -0.44 -0.71 -0.6 
WC_LAG 0.0098 0.014 0.0122 0.0099 0.0102 0.0113 0.01 0.0094 
  (2.69)*** (3.69)*** (3.35)*** (2.60)** (2.73)*** (2.97)*** (2.22)** (2.41)** 
SEOAMT 0.0032 0.0044 0.0038 0.0029 0.0035 0.0033 0.0022 0.0024 
  -1.05 -1.32 -1.28 -0.95 -1.13 -0.97 -0.67 -0.73 
INTERVAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  -1.47 (2.67)*** (2.36)** (1.82)* (1.98)** (2.43)** (1.98)* (2.11)** 
AUDIT 0.0006 0.0009 0.0009 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0001 0.0002 
  -0.75 -0.95 -1.03 -0.5 -0.6 -0.56 -0.15 -0.17 
Industrial/Office -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.001 -0.0005    -0.0004 
  -0.89 (1.72)* (1.68)* -0.77       -0.68 
Lodging -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 0    0.0002 
  -0.08 -0.25 -0.59 -0.07       -0.22 
Residential 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0003    0.0002 
  -0.44 -0.07 -0.33 -0.37       -0.27 
Retail 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0009 0    0 
  -0.22 -1.59 -1.33 -0.06       -0.07 
SOX -0.0014        
  (1.92)*               
4-6 SEOs  0.0003 0.0001  0.0002 0.0004   
    -0.63 -0.17   -0.43 -0.86     
>6 SEOs  0.0018 0.0012  0.0008 0.0015   
    (2.51)** (1.69)*   -1.29 (2.27)**     
Year 2002  -0.0001    0.0001 0.0007 0.0006 
    -0.08       -0.05 -0.51 -0.45 
Year 2003  0.0016    0.002 0.0013 0.0012 
    -1.16       -1.43 -0.97 -0.86 
Year 2004  0.0007    0.0013 0.001 0.0009 
    -0.51       -0.97 -0.77 -0.65 
Year 2005  -0.0001    0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 
    -0.06       -0.18 -0.08 -0.22 
Year 2006  0.0002    0.001 0.0007 0.0004 
    -0.16       -0.73 -0.49 -0.3 
Constant -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.002 -0.0017 -0.0017 
  -0.52 -0.54 -0.43 -0.67 -0.81 -0.76 -0.66 -0.65 
Observations 150 151 149 152 152 152 151 152 
R-squared 0.3 0.38 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.34 0.27 0.27 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Source: Author, 2008     
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4.3.3.2 Manipulation over the Three Quarters 
Although financial results reported for Quarter -1 are most susceptible to earnings management, 
other adjacent quarters are also very susceptible because earnings management naturally continues 
for several quarters to make the manipulation smoother and more difficult to detect. Combined with 
the findings in the univariate analysis, the three quarters before offering announcement are chosen 
to detect potential earnings management. 
Equation (4.3) is used to address this problem. Regression results of manipulation in the three 
quarters (Quarter -3 through Quarter -1) before SEOs17, as illustrated in Table 4. 11 and Table 4. 12, 
show that as SEO frequency increases, FFO manipulation is on the rise while earnings management 
decreases. This supports the findings in testing Hypothesis 2. As SEO frequency increases, the 
focus of manipulation is shifted from earnings to FFO. This finding is supportive to the notion that 
earnings management is more strictly monitored than FFO manipulation. 
Additionally, manipulation of earnings is negatively affected by the ability of REITs to 
generate cash flow while positively associated with the volatility of cash flow from operation. The 
association between DIF and cash flow volatility is largely not significant. As mentioned, low levels 
of cash flow level as well as volatile cash flows are introduced to proxy for financial constraints. 
These findings support Hypothesis 3 which states that financially constrained REITs are likely to 
manage earnings. Constrained cash flow forces managers to be more aggressive in manipulation. 





                                                        
17
 Dependent variable is average manipulation during the three quarters prior to SEO quarter, that is, Quarter -3 through Quarter -1. 
Other variables such as MB, ROA, CFO, and LEV are all averaged over these three quarters. 
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Table 4. 11 Regression results of manipulation in Quarter -3 to -1 (Panel A: earnings) 
 
 
DTA  DWA 
  1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
SEOAMT -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0007 -0.001  -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0024 -0.0018 -0.001 
  -0.57 -0.69 -0.7 -0.29 -0.38  -0.87 -0.67 -1.11 -0.87 -0.46 
SIZE -0.0001 0 0.0001 0 -0.0001  0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
  -0.61 -0.08 -0.34 -0.08 -0.48  -0.77 -1.2 -1.23 -0.81 -0.61 
INSTI 0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0007 0.0029 0.0021  0.0004 0.0008 -0.0009 0.0003 0.0022 
  -0.38 -0.38 -0.26 -1.06 -0.72  -0.18 -0.31 -0.37 -0.15 -0.95 
AUDIT -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0006  -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0002 
  -0.75 -0.42 -0.47 -0.13 -0.69  -0.45 -1.14 -0.56 -0.7 -0.23 
MB -0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0007  0.0008 0.0019 0.0012 0.0012 0.0016 
  -0.8 -0.18 -0.15 -0.45 -0.67  -1.01 (2.41)** -1.63 -1.61 (2.18)** 
ROA 0.0283 0.0272 0.0224 0.0265 0.0306  0.0641 0.064 0.0606 0.0628 0.0656 
  -1.18 -1.09 -0.92 -1.08 -1.22  (3.08)*** (3.07)*** (2.92)*** (3.06)*** (3.18)*** 
LEV -0.0034 -0.0038 -0.0041 -0.0046 -0.0039  -0.0021 -0.0017 -0.0027 -0.0029 -0.0016 
  (2.11)** (2.27)** (2.53)** (2.89)*** (2.33)**  -1.55 -1.23 (1.99)** (2.11)** -1.19 
CFO -0.277 -0.2922 -0.2981 -0.3007 -0.2881  -0.2902 -0.3096 -0.3063 -0.3104 -0.3063 
  (7.40)*** (7.09)*** (7.87)*** (7.97)*** (7.08)***  (9.38)*** (9.63)*** (9.82)*** (10.20)*** (9.89)*** 
CFOVOL 0.1536 0.1508 0.144 0.1385 0.1463  0.1742 0.1603 0.175 0.1771 0.1653 
  (3.83)*** (3.70)*** (3.57)*** (3.38)*** (3.56)***  (5.01)*** (5.62)*** (5.09)*** (5.17)*** (5.80)*** 
Industrial/Office -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0014  -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0007 
  (2.83)*** (2.36)** (2.55)** (2.95)*** (2.72)***  -1.59 -1.32 -1.43 (1.72)* -1.58 
Lodging -0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0038 -0.0041 -0.0042  -0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 
  (6.53)*** (5.88)*** (5.80)*** (6.39)*** (6.42)***  -0.15 -0.71 -0.27 -0.2 -0.26 
Residential -0.003 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.003  -0.001 -0.001 -0.0008 -0.001 -0.0012 
  (4.65)*** (3.93)*** (4.02)*** (4.38)*** (4.52)***  (1.76)* (1.77)* -1.44 (1.77)* (2.22)** 
Retail 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 0 0.0004  0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0 
  -0.86 -1.03 -0.73 -0.09 -0.7  -0.53 -0.33 -0.58 -0.51 -0.01 
SOX -0.0012      -0.0006     
  (2.10)**          -1.3         
4-6 SEOs  -0.0005 -0.0004     -0.0005 -0.0006   
    -1.12 -1.05        -1.5 (1.69)*     
>6 SEOs  -0.0011 -0.0012     -0.0006 -0.0006   
    (1.90)* (1.95)*        -1.16 -1.17     
Year 2002  0   -0.0004   -0.0006   -0.0007 
    -0.06     -0.46    -0.78     -0.94 
Year 2003  0.001   0.0011   0.0006   0.0005 
    -1.21     -1.42    -0.83     -0.66 
Year 2004  0.0004   0.0006   -0.0003   -0.0004 
    -0.48     -0.79    -0.48     -0.61 
Year 2005  0   0.0001   -0.0004   -0.0006 
    -0.01     -0.12    -0.61     -0.87 
Year 2006  0.0011   0.0011   -0.0007   -0.0008 
    -1.15     -1.17    -0.92     -1.05 
Constant 0.0088 0.0074 0.0074 0.008 0.008  0.003 0.0015 0.0028 0.0032 0.0022 
  (4.12)*** (3.23)*** (3.43)*** (3.68)*** (3.49)***  (1.73)* -0.8 -1.61 (1.84)* -1.17 
Observations 223 225 225 225 224  234 236 233 233 235 
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.4 0.39 0.42  0.38 0.41 0.4 0.4 0.41 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
Source: Author, 2008 
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Table 4. 12 Regression results of manipulation in Quarter -3 to -1 (Panel B: FFO) 
 
DIFA  DIFMV 
  1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
SEOAMT 0.0019 0.0021 0.0022 0.0018 0.001  0.0024 0.0033 0.0037 0.0024 0.0038 
  -1.44 (1.85)* (1.79)* -1.38 (1.68)*  -0.93 -1.38 -1.46 -0.93 -1.53 
SIZE 0.0002 0 0.0001 0.0002 0  0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
  -1.39 -0.13 -0.98 -1.59 -0.5  -1.54 -0.59 -1.09 -1.55 -1.38 
INSTI 0.0002 0.0027 0.0023 0 0.0007  0.0019 0.0043 0.0054 0.0019 0.0017 
  -0.1 (1.87)* -1.51 -0.01 -0.51  -0.66 -1.55 (1.87)* -0.67 -0.61 
AUDIT 0.0004 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005  0.0009 0.0013 0.0011 0.0009 0.0009 
  -1.05 (1.95)* -1.42 -1.01 -1.36  -1.21 (1.97)* -1.58 -1.21 -1.21 
MB -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.001 -0.0003 0.0001  -0.001 -0.0018 -0.0024 -0.001 -0.0006 
  -0.7 -0.97 (2.02)** -0.74 -0.32  -1.12 (1.91)* (2.59)** -1.14 -0.63 
ROA 0.018 0.0247 0.0195 0.0199 0.0192  0.0368 0.0395 0.0389 0.0368 0.069 
  -1.29 (2.04)** -1.48 -1.21 -1.58  -1.43 (1.68)* -1.55 -1.44 (3.06)*** 
LEV 0.0013 0.0013 0.0016 0.0013 0.0012  0.0022 0.0023 0.0031 0.0022 0.0021 
  -1.44 (1.74)* (1.97)* -1.48 -1.59  -1.28 -1.45 (1.90)* -1.3 -1.29 
CFO 0.0183 0.0055 0.0285 0.0195 -0.0008  0.0579 0.0451 0.071 0.0578 0.0017 
  -0.93 -0.3 -1.53 -1.02 -0.05  -1.58 -1.27 (2.00)** -1.62 -0.05 
CFOVOL -0.0193 -0.0199 -0.022 -0.0175 -0.0175  -0.0609 -0.0417 -0.0653 -0.061 -0.0229 
  -0.89 -1.06 -1.08 -0.83 -0.97  -1.5 -1.15 (1.67)* -1.51 -0.6 
Industrial/Office 0 0 -0.0002 0 0.0002  -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  -0.14 -0.12 -0.83 -0.07 -0.7  -0.15 -0.85 -0.99 -0.16 -0.22 
Lodging 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006  0.0006 0.0004 0.0002 0.0006 0.0008 
  -1.21 -1.25 -0.45 -1.26 (1.97)*  -0.93 -0.59 -0.25 -0.93 -1.28 
Residential 0.0006 0.0006 0.0001 0.0004 0.0009  0.001 0.0004 0.0003 0.001 0.001 
  -1.65 (1.93)* -0.25 -1.22 (2.94)***  -1.42 -0.68 -0.46 -1.42 -1.56 
Retail -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0001  -0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.001 
  -0.46 (2.10)** (2.28)** -0.73 -0.41  -1.17 (3.27)*** (2.58)** -1.22 (1.88)* 
SOX -0.0002      0     
  -0.54          -0.02         
4-6 SEOs  0.0002 0.0003     0.0001 0.0004   
    -0.89 -1.38        -0.15 -1.05     
>6 SEOs  0.0013 0.0014     0.0023 0.0024   
    (4.28)*** (4.26)***        (3.94)*** (3.89)***     
Year 2002  -0.0005   -0.0005   -0.0009   -0.0008 
    -1.16     -1.3    -1.09     -0.9 
Year 2003  0.0003   0.0001   0.0001   0.0001 
    -0.67     -0.26    -0.14     -0.16 
Year 2004  -0.0001   -0.0002   -0.0006   -0.0008 
    -0.27     -0.54    -0.73     -0.99 
Year 2005  -0.0008   -0.0009   -0.0014   -0.0018 
    (1.80)*     (2.04)**    (1.74)*     (2.18)** 
Year 2006  0   -0.0001   -0.0002   -0.0006 
    -0.01     -0.22    -0.28     -0.67 
Constant -0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.001  -0.0032 -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0032 -0.0022 
  -1.55 -0.83 -1.3 (1.72)* -1.07  -1.54 -0.3 -1.11 -1.55 -1.08 
Observations 238 234 237 235 235  238 235 237 238 237 
R-squared 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.06 0.16  0.09 0.21 0.14 0.09 0.16 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
Source: Author, 2008 
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4.3.3.3 Manipulation in the REIT Industry 
In Equation (4.4), REITs without SEOs during the period are also added into the analysis. As 
can be seen in Table 4.13 and Table 4.14, results of the first three equations are supported here: 
there is a mean-reversion trend in earnings management but not in FFO manipulation; earnings 
management is negatively associated with audit quality; the relation between FFO manipulation and 
audit quality is weak and not significant; higher SEO frequency is associated with less earnings 
management and more FFO manipulation. 
 Additionally, DWA and DIF are both positively correlated with gearing ratio, indicating 
financially constrained REITs are more susceptible to earnings management. Earnings management 
is negatively affected by REIT’s leverage ratio and the ability to generate cash flow while positively 
associated with the volatility of cash flow from operation. Hypothesis 3 about the relation between 
financial constraints and manipulation is supported. Financially constrained REITs are more likely 
to manipulate earnings. No such relation has been found in FFO manipulation. Additionally, the 
coefficients of ROA_LAG are significantly negative for DA, suggesting in the face of better 
performance in the previous quarter, managers would have more incentives to manipulate earnings 
aggressively. Positive coefficients of M/B ratio mean that high expectation from investors reflected 
in this ratio would encourage managers to be more aggressive to boost both earnings and FFO.  
No clear evidence for the relation between earnings management and firm size has been found. 
The relation between firm size and earnings management is so far mixed. Moreover, the coefficients 
of INSTI are significantly negative when DIF is examined, indicating that higher institutional 
holdings help reduce discretion in FFO calculation and thus reduce manipulation. This evidence is 
stronger than in the previous three equations where the coefficients are not significant. Hypothesis 5 
concerning governance and monitoring is only weakly supported in this analysis. Only 
manipulation of FFO significantly reduced after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act came into force, which is 
consistent with the findings in the univariate analysis. 
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Table 4. 13 Regression results of all REIT sample (Panel A) 
 DTA  DWA 
  1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
DEP_LAG 0.1072 0.1099 0.1037 0.1091 0.102  -0.1364 -0.1328 -0.138 -0.1352 -0.1403 
  (5.46)*** (5.60)*** (5.38)*** (5.59)*** (5.25)***  (6.44)*** (6.32)*** (6.62)*** (6.45)*** (6.65)*** 
CFOLAG 0.0971 0.0977 0.1002 0.0952 0.0978  0.01 0.009 0.0104 0.0072 0.0106 
  (5.46)*** (5.60)*** (5.71)*** (5.43)*** (5.45)***  -0.65 -0.6 -0.68 -0.48 -0.68 
CFOVOL 0.0302 0.0315 0.0508 0.0519 0.0383  0.0411 0.0377 0.0419 0.0246 0.0352 
  -1.09 -1.14 (1.83)* (1.85)* -1.42  -1.63 -1.51 (1.70)* -0.98 -1.43 
ROA_LAG 0.0436 0.0414 0.046 0.0416 0.0417  0.0406 0.0436 0.0432 0.0436 0.0433 
  (3.00)*** (2.83)*** (3.15)*** (2.84)*** (2.84)***  (3.49)*** (3.77)*** (3.76)*** (3.77)*** (3.74)*** 
LEV_LAG 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0001 0.0008  0.0016 0.0014 0.0017 0.0018 0.0017 
  -0.43 -0.57 -0.63 -0.07 -0.95  (2.16)** (1.94)* (2.35)** (2.37)** (2.26)** 
MB_LAG -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0006  0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0009 0.0006 
  -0.99 -0.8 -0.95 -0.47 -1.16  (1.85)* (1.86)* -1.42 (2.22)** -1.27 
SIZE -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0 -0.0001  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  -0.58 -0.75 -0.59 -0.18 -0.71  (1.88)* (2.16)** (1.85)* (2.03)** (2.03)** 
INSTI 0.0019 0.0017 0.0004 0.0016 0.0003  0.0004 0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0005 
  -1 -0.95 -0.22 -0.88 -0.14  -0.24 -0.39 -0.33 -0.1 -0.32 
AUDIT -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.001 -0.0011 -0.0009  -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0005 
  (2.99)*** (3.01)*** (2.58)** (3.01)*** (2.30)**  -1.64 (2.02)** (1.75)* (2.40)** -1.5 
Industrial/Office 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003  0.0013 0.0015 0.0014 0.0014 0.0013 
  -0.86 -1.19 -1.3 -0.7 -0.87  (3.84)*** (4.40)*** (4.03)*** (4.21)*** (3.97)*** 
Lodging -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0024  0.0006 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.0006 
  (4.97)*** (4.75)*** (4.37)*** (4.77)*** (4.87)***  -1.35 (1.93)* (1.88)* (2.15)** -1.41 
Residential 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0  0.0007 0.0009 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 
  -0.23 -0.34 -0.74 -0.54 -0.06  (1.82)* (2.27)** -1.53 -1.53 (1.77)* 
Retail 0.0015 0.0016 0.0018 0.0016 0.0014  0.0015 0.0017 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 
  (3.75)*** (3.89)*** (4.34)*** (3.85)*** (3.59)***  (4.35)*** (4.87)*** (4.42)*** (4.47)*** (4.51)*** 
SOX -0.0002      0     
  -0.66          -0.18         
Q4  -0.0004      -0.0004    
    -1.29          (1.81)*       
1-3 SEOs   0.0002 0.0002     -0.0005 -0.0005  
      -0.66 -0.84        (2.13)** (1.97)**   
4-6 SEOs   -0.0001 -0.0001     -0.001 -0.001  
      -0.15 -0.27        (3.13)*** (3.07)***   
>6 SEOs   -0.0011 -0.0012     -0.0009 -0.0009  
      -1.54 (1.78)*        -1.6 -1.58   
Year 2002   0.0007  0.0008    0.0001  0.0001 
      (1.66)*   (1.77)*      -0.15   -0.26 
Year 2003   0.0001  0.0002    0.0002  0.0002 
      -0.29   -0.42      -0.45   -0.61 
Year 2004   0.0004  0.0005    0.0003  0.0002 
      -0.93   -1      -0.69   -0.55 
Year 2005   0.0005  0.0006    0.0003  0.0002 
      -1.11   -1.34      -0.71   -0.48 
Year 2006   0.0006  0.0007    0.0002  0.0001 
      -1.2   -1.42      -0.41   -0.18 
Constant -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0017  -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0021 
  -1.18 -1.32 (1.77)* (1.77)* -1.45  (2.32)** (2.10)** (1.82)* (1.84)* (2.19)** 
Observations 1755 1755 1760 1759 1761  1727 1726 1732 1727 1729 
R-squared 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
Source: Author, 2008 
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Table 4. 14 Regression results of all REIT sample (Panel B) 
 DIFA  DIFMV 
  1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5 
DEP_LAG 0.1362 0.1389 0.131 0.1334 0.1335  0.2804 0.2865 0.2732 0.2779 0.2757 
  (10.08)*** (10.31)*** (9.75)*** (9.96)*** (9.90)***  (16.68)*** (17.44)*** (16.40)*** (16.71)*** (16.59)*** 
CFOLAG -0.0362 -0.0267 -0.0345 -0.028 -0.0337  -0.0534 -0.0381 -0.052 -0.0499 -0.0518 
  (3.82)*** (2.86)*** (3.70)*** (3.04)*** (3.60)***  (2.49)** (1.83)* (2.45)** (2.36)** (2.44)** 
CFOVOL -0.0307 -0.0302 -0.0153 -0.0215 -0.0233  -0.0278 -0.0191 -0.0301 -0.0346 -0.0335 
  -1.56 -1.54 -0.77 -1.08 -1.19  -0.62 -0.43 -0.67 -0.76 -0.76 
ROA_LAG 0.0052 0.0035 0.0011 0.0021 0.0046  -0.0128 -0.0175 -0.0162 -0.0145 -0.0151 
  -0.58 -0.4 -0.12 -0.24 -0.51  -0.61 -0.84 -0.77 -0.69 -0.72 
LEV_LAG 0.0019 0.0019 0.0022 0.0023 0.002  0.0035 0.0046 0.0042 0.0041 0.0039 
  (3.66)*** (3.69)*** (4.21)*** (4.30)*** (3.79)***  (2.74)*** (3.69)*** (3.30)*** (3.20)*** (3.08)*** 
MB_LAG 0.0009 0.0003 0.0007 0.0001 0.0009  0.0002 -0.0007 0 -0.0007 0.0002 
  (2.86)*** -1.06 (2.04)** -0.5 (2.81)***  -0.23 -1.05 -0.02 -0.99 -0.26 
SIZE 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0 0 -0.0001 0 0 
  -0.93 -1.09 -0.67 -0.71 -0.94  -0.1 -0.05 -0.34 -0.01 -0.15 
INSTI -0.0017 -0.0033 -0.0013 -0.0026 -0.0016  -0.0074 -0.0107 -0.0058 -0.0083 -0.0063 
  -1.45 (2.91)*** -1.08 (2.28)** -1.36  (2.62)*** (4.07)*** (2.03)** (3.03)*** (2.24)** 
AUDIT -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004  -0.0002 -0.0003 0 0.0002 -0.0003 
  (1.91)* -1.56 -0.74 -0.53 -1.61  -0.37 -0.54 -0.04 -0.31 -0.52 
Industrial/Office -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0008  -0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0014 
  (3.25)*** (2.98)*** (3.84)*** (3.69)*** (3.46)***  (2.51)** (2.09)** (2.75)*** (2.47)** (2.57)** 
Lodging 0.0002 0.0001 0 -0.0002 0.0002  -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002 
  -0.71 -0.19 0 -0.51 -0.73  -0.6 -0.42 -0.47 -0.5 -0.22 
Residential -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004  -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.001 -0.0007 -0.001 
  (1.68)* -1.37 -1.42 -1.32 -1.63  -1.42 -1.3 -1.63 -1.23 -1.62 
Retail -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0009  -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.002 -0.0017 -0.0017 
  (3.74)*** (3.39)*** (4.40)*** (4.35)*** (3.74)***  (2.77)*** (2.84)*** (3.34)*** (2.93)*** (3.00)*** 
SOX 0.0008      0.0011     
  (4.38)***          (2.62)***         
Q4  -0.0006      -0.0016    
    (3.43)***          (4.22)***       
1-3 SEOs   0.0004 0.0004     0.0002 0.0002  
      (2.24)** (2.23)**        -0.57 -0.6   
4-6 SEOs   0.001 0.001     0.0008 0.001  
      (4.23)*** (4.37)***        -1.53 (1.78)*   
>6 SEOs   0.0013 0.0013     0.0013 0.0014  
      (4.02)*** (4.21)***        (1.82)* (1.92)*   
Year 2002   0.0004  0.0003    -0.0003  -0.0003 
      -1.26   -1.18      -0.45   -0.5 
Year 2003   -0.0005  -0.0005    -0.0017  -0.0017 
      (1.80)*   (1.77)*      (2.53)**   (2.58)*** 
Year 2004   -0.0004  -0.0005    -0.0013  -0.0014 
      -1.47   (1.71)*      (1.90)*   (2.01)** 
Year 2005   -0.0004  -0.0005    -0.0015  -0.0016 
      -1.52   (1.84)*      (2.25)**   (2.37)** 
Year 2006   -0.0007  -0.0009    -0.0019  -0.0019 
      (2.52)**   (2.87)***      (2.67)***   (2.79)*** 
Constant -0.001 0 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0006  0.0015 0.0028 0.0028 0.0021 0.0029 
  -1.43 -0.04 -1.04 -0.54 -0.81  -0.89 (1.74)* -1.61 -1.28 (1.69)* 
Observations 1498 1498 1500 1499 1498  1490 1490 1490 1490 1490 
R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.13  0.21 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.22 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   Source: Author, 2008 
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Difference in FFO manipulation across years is more significant than in earnings 
management. In addition to year dummies, the variable of TIMESEQ is introduced to 
detect possible linear trend in financial results manipulation. A clear declining trend in 
manipulation over time has been found. Coefficients of TIMESEQ are significantly 
negative for FFO manipulation. It means that manipulation of FFO is decreasing over 
time. This is consistent with Hypothesis 6 and relevant findings in the additional 
discussion section.  
Under more scrutiny and stricter regulation, manipulation in REIT industry is as 
a whole declining. This is consistent with the fact that corporate governance and 
regulatory environment in the REIT industry have been strengthened over time. As 
NAREIT publishes more White Papers about how to calculate FFO, the definition 
becomes clearer and there is less flexibility in FFO calculation up to managerial 
discretion. Meanwhile, accounting flexibility in earnings management remains largely 
the same and no clear change in the trend is found. Hypothesis 6 is supported. 
Fig 4. 18 Earnings management in four quarters 





















Earnings management is negatively related to audit quality but no such relation 
has been found between audit quality and FFO manipulation. That means, for REITs 
hiring external auditors of higher quality, there is less earnings management. 
Meanwhile, coefficients of Q4 are significantly negative for both earnings 
management (DWA) and FFO manipulation (DIFA and DIFMV), indicating that 
manipulation is less in the fourth quarter than in the other three quarters. Both these 
two findings support the argument that weak monitoring increases financial 
manipulation. 
4.3.4 Test Summary: Specific Event 
Here is a summary of findings in testing earnings management around SEOs 
using the multivariate method. Most hypotheses are supported in the test.  
Evidence is found that both earnings and FFO are manipulated around SEOs. 
REITs with more frequent SEOs tend to have more manipulation of FFO and less 
earnings management. As SEO frequency increases, the focus of manipulation is 
shifted from earnings to FFO.  
Additionally, financial results manipulation is influenced by several other factors. 
It is found that financially constrained REITs are more likely to manipulate financial 
performance. Higher external auditor quality and institutional holdings help to reduce 
earnings management. In a word, frequent equity offering, financial constraints and 
weak governance and supervision are the features of REITs more likely to 
manipulation financial results.  
Moreover, manipulation of financial results is generally declining over the 
 87
sample period of 2001-2006 which indicates that regulation and monitoring in the 
REIT industry is getting strengthened over time.  
4.4 Testing Benchmark 
As a supplement to the analysis about the specific event, benchmark related 
earnings management is discussed in this section. Two benchmarks are discussed: 
avoiding losses (Hypothesis 7) and avoiding declines (Hypothesis 8). Considering the 
dual performance measures in the REIT industry, each benchmark is discussed 
separately in terms of net income and FFO. As a result, there are four scenarios: level 
of earnings (NI), level of FFO (FFO), changes in earnings ( NI∆ ) and changes in FFO 
( FFO∆ ).The sample period covered in this analysis is 2000Q1 through 2006Q4. All 
financial data are from Compustat database18. 
Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Dechow et al. (2003), net income 
and reported FFO are scaled with market value at the end of the quarter (hereafter NI 
and FFO respectively). Changes in NI/FFO are defined as changes from the same 
quarter last year. The results are categorized into groups defined by band width. Each 
group has a width of 0.00519. For instance, when analyzing the distribution of NI, 
Group 0 contains all firm-quarters where 0 0.005NI≤ < , Group 1 includes all 
firm-quarters where 0.005 0.010NI≤ <  and so on. Similar criteria apply to the other 
three scenarios.  
Three methods are utilized to test earnings management around benchmarks. 
First, the distribution of different groups in the four scenarios is examined. Second, 
mean comparison method is used to investigate whether there is significant difference 
                                                        
18
 This section focuses on testing the benchmark issue and is separate from previous sections. Information about 
equity offerings discussed before is not relevant and hence not considered here. Only financial results are used. 
19
 Follow the method used by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Dechow et al. (2003). 
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in firm characteristics among groups around the benchmarks. Third, quartile plots are 
used to directly examine changes in earnings management measures. 
4.4.1 Distribution Method 
The distributions of NI, FFO, NI∆ and FFO∆ are shown in Fig 4. 19. The two 
long tails are truncated because the focus is on groups around benchmarks. Kinks in 
the distribution of NI and FFO are obvious. In the upper two graphs, frequency of 
Group -1 is extremely lower compared with Group 0-2. This means REITs reporting 
small losses are unusually rare and REITs reporting small profits are unusually 
common. The same pattern can be found in the distribution of FFO. There are 
relatively fewer REITs reporting small negative FFO and far more REITs reporting 
small positive FFO. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 7. However, no clear 
evidence of kinks is found in the distributions of NI∆ and FFO∆ .  
4.4.2 Mean Comparison Method 
As mentioned, there are four scenarios each with a benchmark to meet. In each 
scenario, the four groups closely around benchmarks are selected, that is, Group -2, -1, 
0, and 1. Manipulation measures such as DTA, DWA, DIFA, DIFMV and firm 
characteristics such as leverage ratio (LEV), market to book ratio (M/B), firm size 
(SIZE) and operating cash flow over total assets (CFO) are compared among the four 
groups. In each scenario, the four groups can be divided into two types: close 
benchmark beaters and close losers (hereafter beaters and losers). Namely, beaters are 
Group 0 and Group 1, while losers stand for Group -2 and Group -1.  
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4.4.2.1 Net Income (NI) Comparison 
As shown in Table 4. 15, in comparison with all other REITs, DTA and DWA of 
beaters are not significantly higher even at 10% level. This finding is consistent with 
previous findings that earnings management in REITs is less obvious. 
However, differences in leverage, M/B ratio, firm size and cash flow are 
statistically significant in most comparisons. Compared with other REITs, beaters 
tend to have higher leverage, higher M/B, larger size and poor cash flow generating 
ability. In contrast, losers are more likely to be smaller REITs with higher leverage 
and constrained ability to generate cash flows. 
These findings about the relations between earnings management and firm 
characteristics are consistent with the findings of earnings management around SEOs 
discussed in previous sections. REITs with high gearing and poor ability to generate 
cash flow tend to manipulate their reported financial performance. Additionally, Watts 
and Zimmerman’s (1986) indication that large firms are more likely to manage 
earnings is supported. Large firms are more reluctant to report losses and hence have 
stronger incentives to boost earnings. 
4.4.2.2 FFO Comparison 
In the second scenario with zero FFO as the benchmark, similar comparisons are 
conducted to detect any difference in firm characteristics among the four selected 
groups. The results are given in Table 4. 16. Different from the first scenario of NI, 
differences in FFO manipulation among various groups are strongly significant in 
both Panel B and C. Losers have lower DIF than other REITs. For REITs reporting 
small positive FFO, FFO manipulation measured by DIF is much larger than losers. 
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This is also consistent with the findings in testing Hypothesis 1. Manipulation of FFO 
is more observable and significant. In Panel A, beaters have higher DIF although the 
result is only significantly at a 15% level. A Signrank test is tried in addition to mean 
comparison (t-test), but the significance of the results is not improved. 
Moreover, differences in leverage, M/B ratio, size and the ability to generate cash 
flow are not as clear as those found in the first scenario of NI. Compared with others, 
both beaters and losers have smaller size, while there is no significant difference in 
firm size between these two groups. When the two groups are compared, beaters tend 
to have lower cash flow-generating ability. In sum, small size REITs with constrained 
cash flow is more likely to manipulate FFO. 
4.4.2.3 Change in NI ( NI∆ ) Comparison 
Similar comparison in firm characteristics among different groups is conducted 
in the third scenario where zero change in NI is the benchmark. The results are 
demonstrated in Table 4. 17. As shown in Panel A, DTA of beaters is significantly 
higher than other REITs, while the difference in DWA and DIF is not significant. The 
mean DTA and DWA of losers are both lower, but the results are only significant at a 
15% level. In Panel C, two groups are compared directly. Compared with losers, 
beaters have higher DTA, DWA but lower DIF. It means that both beaters and losers 
have manipulated their GAAP earnings trying to surpass the benchmark. REITs which 
slightly beat the benchmark in NI∆ are more aggressive in manipulation. 
The relation between earnings management and specific firm characteristics is 
different from previous two scenarios. Compared with other REITs, beaters and loser 
both have higher M/B ratio, larger firm size and higher cash flow. When these two 
groups are compared, beaters have higher leverage and lower M/B ratio, smaller size 
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and low cash flow. This means that both beaters and losers exercise earnings 
management. However, only part of them can successfully surpass the benchmark and 
finally become benchmark beaters. Compared with losers, beaters tend to have 
smaller size and lower ability to generate cash flow. 
4.4.2.4 Change in FFO ( FFO∆ ) Comparison 
The final comparison is for groups with different changes in FFO. The 
comparison results are listed in Table 4. 18. As shown in Panel A, beaters have higher 
DIF than the other REITs. In contrast, no significant difference in DIF is found 
between losers and the other REITs. When the beaters and losers are compared, 
Beaters’ DIF is significantly higher than that of losers. Again, the relation between 
these firm characteristics and earnings management practices are different from those 
in discussing the first two benchmarks of zero NI or FFO. In this scenario, both 
beaters and losers have the same characteristics such as large firm size and better cash 
flow ratio. Comparison between beaters and losers directly reveals that close beaters 
tend to have higher leverage, smaller size and lower cash flow ratio. 
To sum up the mean comparison method, both Hypothesis 7 and 8 are supported. 
Results show that financial results (earnings and FFO) are manipulated in order to 
beat certain benchmarks (zero NI, zero FFO, zero growth in NI and zero growth in 
FFO). Meanwhile, analysis of the relation between financial results manipulation and 
firm characteristics provides additional evidence in support of Hypothesis 3. High 
leverage and diminished capability to generate cash flow are the common features of 
earnings manipulators. Financially constrained REITs are more likely to exert 
managerial discretion and manage financial results.  
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Table 4. 15 Comparison of firm characteristics: NI 
 
Panel A: Comparison between small profit REITs and all others 
 Beaters  All Others   
 Mean Number  Mean Number t-test p-value 
DTA -0.0021538 603  -0.0011642 1845 -0.8668 0.1931 
DWA 0.0010181 569  -0.0000494 1833 1.1068 0.1343 
DIFMV 0.0009966 516  -0.0002293 1231 1.1873 0.1176 
DIFA 0.0005553 516  0.0000538 1250 1.4709 0.0707 
Leverage 0.648152 786  0.6046062 2512 5.717 0.0000 
M/B ratio 1.310859 786  1.167392 2397 8.1912 0.0000 
Size 7.314828 786  6.987388 2512 5.6404 0.0000 
Cash flow 0.0142907 785  0.0158435 2445 -3.5858 0.0002 
Panel B: Comparison between small loss REITs and all others 
 Losers  All Others   
 Mean Number  Mean Number t-test p-value 
DTA -0.0034234 116  -0.0013077 2332 -0.9137 0.1805 
DWA 0.000177 113  0.0002048 2289 -0.0143 0.4943 
DIFMV 0.001613 78  0.0000636 1669 0.6792 0.2486 
DIFA 0.0005714 78  0.0001832 1688 0.5141 0.3036 
Leverage 0.6536065 153  0.6131054 3145 2.6148 0.0045 
M/B ratio 1.16288 153  1.204836 3030 -1.1762 0.1198 
Size 6.666073 153  7.084853 3145 -3.5509 0.0002 
Cash flow 0.0106369 151  0.015703 3079 -5.7759 0.0000 
Panel C: Comparison between small profit REITs and small loss REITs 
 Beaters  Losers   
 Mean Number  Mean Number t-test p-value 
DTA -0.0021538 603  -0.0034234 116 0.9508 0.1710 
DWA 0.0010181 569  0.000177 113 0.3562 0.3609 
DIFMV 0.0009966 516  0.001613 78 -0.6239 0.2665 
DIFA 0.0005553 516  0.0005714 78 -0.03 0.4880 
Leverage 0.648152 786  0.6536065 153 -0.3993 0.3449 
M/B ratio 1.310859 786  1.16288 153 2.7031 0.0035 
Size 7.314828 786  6.666073 153 5.8825 0.0000 
Cash flow 0.0142907 785  0.0106369 151 4.8037 0.0000 
 
Test statistic is based on mean comparison across samples (t-test) with p-values reported. 
DTA stands for discretionary total accruals calculated using the cross-sectional modified 
Jones model. DWA means discretionary working capital accruals obtained using the Teoh’s  
Model. 
DIFMV stands for DIF scaled by market value. 
DIFA stands for DIF scaled by total assets. 
Leverage ratio equals total liability over total assets. 
Size equals ln(total assets) 
Cash flow is calculated using cash flow from operation over total assets. 
 





Table 4. 16 Comparison of firm characteristics: FFO 
  
Panel A: Comparison between REITs with small positive FFO and all others 
 Beaters  All Others   
  Mean Number  Mean Number t-test p-value 
DTA -0.005089 67  -0.0013044 2381 -1.2554 0.1047  
DWA 0.0027518 66  0.0001315 2336 1.0445 0.1482  
DIFMV 0.0027454 61  0.0000382 1686 1.0549 0.1458  
DIFA 0.0000126 61  0.0002071 1705 0.2289 0.4095  
Leverage 0.5561138 87  0.6165794 3211 -2.9753 0.0015  
M/B ratio 1.247616 87  1.20156 3096 0.9841 0.1626  
Size 6.841944 87  7.07148 3211 -0.4806 0.0694  
Cash flow 0.0073628 87  0.0156904 3143 -7.3037 0.0000  
Panel B: Comparison between REITs with small negative FFO and all others 
 Losers  All Others   
  Mean Number  Mean Number t-test p-value 
DTA -0.002161 12  -0.0014043 2436 -0.1074 0.4572  
DWA -0.0031708 12  0.0002204 2390 -0.583 0.2800  
DIFMV -0.009849 14  0.0002134 1733 -1.9058 0.0284  
DIFA -0.0093161 14  0.0002764 1752 -5.5303 0.0000  
Leverage 0.6199667 15  0.6149615 3283 0.1033 0.4589  
M/B ratio 1.22691 15  1.202705 3168 0.2172 0.4140  
Size 6.583369 15  7.067628 3283 -1.3114 0.0949  
Cash flow 0.014744 15  0.0154695 3215 -0.265 0.3955  
Panel C: Comparison between REITs with small positive and negative FFO 
 Beaters  Losers   
  Mean Number  Mean Number t-test p-value 
DTA -0.005089 67  -0.002161 12 -0.37 0.3562  
DWA 0.0027518 66  -0.0031708 12 0.9782 0.1655  
DIFMV 0.0027454 61  -0.009849 14 1.7556 0.0417  
DIFA 0.0000126 61  -0.0093161 14 2.619 0.0054  
Leverage 0.5561138 87  0.6199667 15 -0.9955 0.1609  
M/B ratio 1.247616 87  1.22691 15 0.2283 0.4100  
Size 6.841944 87  6.583369 15 0.7728 0.2207  
Cash flow 0.0073628 87  0.014744 15 -1.4003 0.0823  
 
Test statistic is based on mean comparison across samples (t-test) with p-values reported. 
DTA stands for discretionary total accruals calculated using the cross-sectional modified 
Jones model. DWA means discretionary working capital accruals obtained using the Teoh’s  
Model. 
DIFMV stands for DIF scaled by market value. 
DIFA stands for DIF scaled by total assets. 
Leverage ratio equals total liability over total assets. 
Size equals ln(total assets) 
Cash flow is calculated using cash flow from operation over total assets. 
 




Table 4. 17 Comparison of firm characteristics: changes in NI 
  
Panel A: Comparison between REITs with small NI increases and all others 
 Beaters  All Others   
  Mean Number  Mean Number t-test p-value 
DTA 0.0004489 608  -0.0020216 1840 2.1716  0.0150  
DWA 0.0001361 598  0.0002258 1804 -0.0946  0.4623  
DIFMV 0.0007955 466  -0.0001084 1281 0.8485  0.1981  
DIFA 0.0002428 466  0.0001851 1300 0.1638  0.4349  
Leverage 0.6113011 784  0.6161329 2514 -0.6307  0.2641  
M/B ratio 1.230769 784  1.193685 2399 2.0950  0.0181  
Size 7.208392 784  7.020841 2514 3.2175  0.0007  
Cash flow 0.0160878 783  0.0152672 2447 1.8906  0.0294  
Panel B: Comparison between REITs with small NI decreases and all others 
 Losers  All Others   
  Mean Number  Mean Number t-test p-value 
DTA -0.0019828 943  -0.0010478 1505 -0.9250  0.1775  
DWA -0.0003688 932  0.0005663 1470 -1.1111  0.1333  
DIFMV 0.0011592 734  -0.000611 1013 1.8561  0.0318  
DIFA 0.0006012 734  -0.0000848 1032 2.1820  0.0146  
Leverage 0.5984744 1219  0.6246647 2079 -3.8853  0.0001  
M/B ratio 1.255811 1219  1.169928 1964 5.4960  0.0000  
Size 7.318879 1219  6.916815 2079 7.8823  0.0000  
Cash flow 0.0169219 1219  0.0145837 2011 6.1251  0.0000  
Panel C: Comparison between REITs with small NI increases and decreases 
 Beaters  Losers   
  Mean Number  Mean Number t-test p-value 
DTA 0.0004489 608  -0.0019828 943 3.7612  0.0001  
DWA 0.0001361 598  -0.0003688 932 1.2932  0.0981  
DIFMV 0.0007955 466  0.0011592 734 -0.7014  0.2416  
DIFA 0.0002428 466  0.0006012 734 -1.5017  0.0667  
Leverage 0.6113011 784  0.5984744 1219 1.6397  0.0506  
M/B ratio 1.230769 784  1.255811 1219 -1.8010  0.0359  
Size 7.208392 784  7.318879 1219 -1.8164  0.0347  
Cash flow 0.0160878 783  0.0169219 1219 -2.1545  0.0157  
 
Test statistic is based on mean comparison across samples (t-test) with p-values reported. 
DTA stands for discretionary total accruals calculated using the cross-sectional modified 
Jones model. DWA means discretionary working capital accruals obtained using the Teoh’s  
Model. 
DIFMV stands for DIF scaled by market value. 
DIFA stands for DIF scaled by total assets. 
Leverage ratio equals total liability over total assets. 
Size equals ln(total assets) 
Cash flow is calculated using cash flow from operation over total assets. 
 




Table 4. 18 Comparison of firm characteristics: changes in FFO 
  
Panel A: Comparison between REITs with small FFO increases and all others 
 Beaters  All Others   
  Mean Number  Mean Number t-test p-value 
DTA -0.0012505 405  -0.0014392 2043 0.1425  0.4433  
DWA -0.0004596 389  0.0003316 2013 -0.7107  0.2387  
DIFMV 0.0017249 391  -0.0003264 1356 1.8160  0.0348  
DIFA 0.0006522 391  0.0000719 1375 1.5540  0.0602  
Leverage 0.6383613 510  0.610708 2788 3.0701  0.0011  
M/B ratio 1.205752 510  1.202259 2673 -0.1679  0.4334  
Size 7.285257 510  7.025212 2788 3.7914  0.0001  
Cash flow 0.0160211 509  0.0153623 2721 1.2901  0.0986  
Panel B: Comparison between REITs with small FFO decreases and all others 
 Losers  All Others   
  Mean Number  Mean Number t-test p-value 
DTA -0.0002807 604  -0.0017772 1844 1.3117  0.0949  
DWA -0.0000807 583  0.0002946 1819 -0.3923  0.3474  
DIFMV 0.0005138 628  -0.0000811 1119 0.6058  0.2723  
DIFA 0.0003001 628  0.0001453 1138 0.4776  0.3165  
Leverage 0.607491 790  0.6173446 2508 -1.2899  0.0986  
M/B ratio 1.303494 790  1.169583 2393 7.6485  0.0000  
Size 7.448974 790  6.944611 2508 8.7618  0.0000  
Cash flow 0.0171844 790  0.0149098 2440 5.2759  0.0000  
Panel C: Comparison between REITs with small FFO increases and decreases 
 Beaters  Losers   
  Mean Number  Mean Number t-test p-value 
DTA -0.0012505 405  -0.0002807 604 -0.9182  0.1794  
DWA -0.0004596 389  -0.0000807 583 -0.7783  0.2183  
DIFMV 0.0017249 391  0.0005138 628 2.3046  0.0107  
DIFA 0.0006522 391  0.0003001 628 1.3532  0.0881  
Leverage 0.6383613 510  0.607491 790 3.5325  0.0002  
M/B ratio 1.205752 510  1.303494 790 -5.7139  0.0000  
Size 7.285257 510  7.448974 790 -2.6269  0.0044  
Cash flow 0.0160211 509  0.0171844 790 -2.2376  0.0127  
 
Test statistic is based on mean comparison across samples (t-test) with p-values reported. 
DTA stands for discretionary total accruals calculated using the cross-sectional modified 
Jones model. DWA means discretionary working capital accruals obtained using the Teoh’s  
Model. 
DIFMV stands for DIF scaled by market value. 
DIFA stands for DIF scaled by total assets. 
Leverage ratio equals total liability over total assets. 
Size equals ln(total assets) 
Cash flow is calculated using cash flow from operation over total assets. 
 




4.4.3 Quartile Plots Method 
Next, an alternative method is used to examine these differences even if they are 
not statistically significant. DTA/DWA and DIF across different groups are plotted to 
display if the increase in manipulation around benchmarks is unusual and different 
from other groups. Three quartiles are calculated for each group and plotted in the 
graphs. The Median line in the middle is used to capture the general trend in the level 
of earnings management. The Lower quartile line and Upper quartile line as well as 
the distance between them indicate how manipulation choices vary within certain 
group. 
4.4.3.1 Benchmark 1: Level of NI/FFO 
Distribution of DTA, DWA and DIF across different groups is shown in Fig 4. 20. 
In all the four graphs, a clear increase can be found between Group -1 and 0. 
Additionally, the distribution of DTA has a reversed U-shape in the middle part and 
there is a clear up trend starting from Group -2. According to the middle part of the 
graph, as the reported level of NI increases, earnings management indicated by DTA 
is on the rise. These findings all indicate that the kinks shown in Fig 4. 19 are related 
to accruals management. Beaters are associated with more earnings management. 
The lower two graphs in Fig 4. 20 illustrate how DIF distribute across different 
FFO groups. In contrast with the upper two graphs, DIF is relatively stable in the 
middle but volatile at both ends. However, an increase in DIF, although not very 
obvious, still can be found between Group -2 and 0, which provides evidence that 
manipulation of FFO exists, consistent with the findings in previous sections. Beaters 
of FFO tend to have higher DIF than losers. 
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4.4.3.2 Benchmark 2: Changes in NI/FFO 
Additionally, the distribution of DTA, DWA and DIF across groups with different 
changes in NI/FFO is examined. Results are shown in Fig 4. 21. Similar to the 
findings of last section, an increasing trend can be found in the upper two graphs. 
DTA and DWA increase between Group -4 and Group 0. It means that the kinks found 
before can be partly explained by earnings management. The lower two graphs 
display how DIF changes across groups with different changes in FFO. The middle 
part is very flat and no clear change in trend can be found. One possible reason is that 
a window of 21 groups (Group -10 to Group 10) is selected to display a relatively 
long-term trend. If the window is shortened, changes in DIF would become more 
obvious. This problem will be addressed next.  
4.4.3.3 Four Manipulation Measures Together 
To highlight the changes in earnings management across different groups, the 
selected window is shortened to 9 groups, namely, from Group -4 to Group 4. All the 
four measures of manipulation (DTA/DWA and DIFA/DIFMV) are displayed in the 
same graph. This would help to illustrate how managers make choices about financial 
results manipulation. Results are shown in Fig 4. 22. The four scenarios discussed 
before are all demonstrated in this graph.  
When Net Income (NI) or changes in NI is considered, attention is paid to 
manipulation of GAAP earnings measured by discretionary total accruals (DTA) and 
discretionary working capital accruals (DWA). As shown in the left two graphs, there 
is an increase between Group -1 and 1 in the upper graph and an increase between 
Group -4 and Group 0 in the lower one. Additionally, a clear increasing trend is found 
in DTA but not for DWA. In these two graphs, changes in DIF are less clear, 
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especially in the first graph. It may suggest that when managers try to avoid a loss or a 
decline in GAAP earnings, FFO is nearly not relevant. 
The two graphs on the right show the situation when managers need to boost 
FFO in order to avoid a negative FFO or a decline in FFO on a seasonal basis. 
Therefore the difference in calculating FFO (DIF) should be the focus. A clear up 
trend in DIF in found between Group -2 and 0 in both graphs, indicating REITs 
manipulate FFO aggressively through DIF in order to avoid reporting a negative FFO 
or a decline in FFO. Analysis of these four graphs provides evidence that 
earnings/FFO are manipulated around the benchmarks. A notable fact is that DTA and 
DIF run in opposite directions at most times. One possible explanation is that the 
accounting adjustment at managerial discretion is limited. In some cases, managers 
may have to make a choice between the two goals.  
4.4.4 Test Summary: Benchmark 
In testing earnings management around benchmarks, three methods are used. The 
distribution method and quartile plots method are more graphic, the mean comparison 
method is employed to provide more statistical explanations.  
Results show that earnings and FFO are manipulated in order to beat certain 
benchmarks in performance. Both Hypothesis 7 and 8 are supported. Meanwhile, 
analysis of the relation between manipulation and firm characteristics provides 
additional evidence in support of Hypothesis 3. Financially constrained REITs are 
more likely to exert managerial discretion and manage financial results. These 
findings are consistent with those in testing the specific event direction.  
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4.5 Chapter Summary 
Chapter 4 presents the results of empirical analysis and demonstrates how to 
detect both Specific Event-driven and Benchmark-driven earnings management.  
In testing manipulation around specific events (SEOs), both univariate and 
multivariate analysis indicate that REITs do manipulate their financial results around 
SEOs, although the earnings management is less obvious than that of general stocks. 
REITs with more frequent SEOs tend to have more manipulation of FFO and less 
earnings management. For REITs with higher SEO frequency, the focus of 
manipulation shifts from earnings to FFO. Additionally, it is found that financially 
constrained REITs are more likely to manipulate financial performance. Frequent 
equity offering, financial constraints and weak governance and supervision are the 
features of REITs more likely to manipulation financial results. Moreover, 
manipulation of financial results is generally declining over the sample period of 
2001-2006 which indicates that regulation and monitoring in the REIT industry is 
strengthening over time. 
In testing financial results manipulation around benchmarks, results show that 
earnings and FFO are manipulated in order to beat certain performance benchmarks. 
Meanwhile, financially constrained REITs are more likely to exert managerial 
discretion and manage financial results. These findings are consistent with those in 





Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Review of Research Objectives 
The two questions raised in the introduction are addressed in the analysis. To 
answer the first question of whether there is earnings management in the REIT 
industry, both specific event and benchmark related incentives are examined. To 
answer the second question about how earnings management is influenced by various 
factors, firm characteristics and corporate governance-related features are discussed. 
This study mainly focuses on testing earnings management around specific events and 
SEOs are selected as the specific event to examine. Testing earnings manipulation 
around benchmarks can be seen as a supplement to the discussion about earnings 
management around SEOs, whose results are used to cross-check with each other. 
The two questions mentioned above are addressed in testing earnings 
management around SEOs (the specific event). For the first question, it is found that 
REITs do manage their earnings, but the earnings management behavior is different 
from other general stocks. This is partly determined by the unique characteristics of 
the REIT industry. They have two performance measures both closely monitored by 
market participants: Net income (earnings) and FFO. Net income is calculated within 
GAAP framework. In contrast, FFO is just an industry-specific standard that REITs 
have no legal obligation to follow. Evidence is found that REITs manage their 
earnings through discretionary accruals around SEOs although the significance of 
statistical tests is not very strong. In contrast, manipulation of FFO is more obvious 
and statistically significant. 
For the second question, this study tries to find out which factors affect REITs’ 
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earnings management practices around SEOs. The ability to generate cash flow, the 
stability of cash flow, the frequency to issue equity and corporate governance settings 
all influence earnings management. Limited capability to generate cash flow, high 
volatility in cash flow, frequent SEOs and slack governance and monitoring are the 
features of REITs which are more likely to manipulate earnings. 
5.2 Key Findings and Conclusions 
An association is found between financial results manipulation and the SEO 
frequency of REITs. This is related to another characteristic of the REIT industry. 
Because of its special payout requirement, REITs need to heavily depend on external 
capital to finance their investments and expansions. Frequent issuers tend to have 
more manipulation of FFO. The more frequently REITs go to capital market and issue 
seasoned equity, the more aggressive they are in manipulating FFO and the less so in 
manipulating earnings. 
There are notable differences between these two types of manipulation. There is 
a mean-reversion trend in discretionary working capital accruals, but not for FFO 
manipulation. It means earnings management can not last for a long period, but 
manipulation of FFO has no such limitation. This can partly explain why the focus of 
manipulation shifts from earnings to FFO for REITs with higher SEO frequency. 
In sum, financial results manipulation in the REIT industry is influenced by 
various factors. Constrained capability to generate cash flow, high leverage, volatile 
cash flow, frequent SEOs, slack monitoring and weak corporate governance are the 
features of REITs which are more likely to manipulate financial results. 
In exploring the relation between earnings management and performance 
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benchmarks, four scenarios are examined. In each scenario, there is a benchmark or 
threshold for REITs to surpass: NI, FFO, NI∆ and FFO∆ . Evidence is found that 
REITs manage their earnings/FFO to avoid reporting losses or declines in 
earnings/FFO. High leverage and low cash flow generating ability are basically 
associated with earnings management in all the four scenarios. It is consistent with the 
findings in discussing earnings management around SEOs.  
Taken together, results of testing the two cases both support the hypothesis that 
there is financial results manipulation in the REIT industry and this is influenced by 
various factors. Limited capability to generate cash flow, high leverage, high volatility 
in cash flow, frequent SEOs, slack monitoring and weak corporate governance are the 
features of REITs which are more likely to manipulate financial results. 
5.3 Contributions and Limitations 
This study is, to my best knowledge, the first to comprehensively examine 
potential financial results manipulation in the REIT industry. This is the most 
important academic contribution of this study. By testing two different types of 
incentives, this study finds clear evidence that REIT managers exert their discretion 
and manipulate financial performance, although the REIT industry has long been 
regarded as more strictly regulated with higher transparency.  
Results in this study indicate that manipulation in this industry is generally 
decreasing as a result of stricter regulation and more monitoring from both inside and 
outside. By highlighting the importance of corporate governance and financial market 
regulation, this study makes some contributions to regulatory authorities. Additionally, 
this study provides some features of those REITs that are more likely to manipulate 
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results, which may help REIT investors to be more cautious and informed when 
making their investment decisions. Therefore, this study has considerable implications 
to both regulators and investors. Moreover, NAREIT should cooperate with SEC and 
continue to promote FFO as a uniform and standard REIT performance gauge. 
However, the definition of FFO itself is not complete and perfect. For instance, the 
maintenance expenditures required to keep buildings in good working condition such 
as light fixtures, flooring repairs, paint, and general repairs is not considered. It is 
important to adjust for these expenditures. Other measures such as AFFO, CAD and 
FAD also need best practice guidance. 
There are also some limitations in this study. The difference between actual FFO 
and expected FFO is used as a proxy for manipulation of FFO. This best guess is a 
practical choice because many REITs do not release all the details of FFO calculation 
in their financial statements. However, it might cause some potential bias. In addition 
to the three benchmarks discussed above, there is another benchmark which is unique 
to the REIT industry, that is, managers may manipulate results to maintain their REIT 
status. But this unique benchmark is not examined in this study and should be a good 
direction for future research. 
The aim of earnings management is to influence stock prices. Whether earnings 
management matters in the REIT industry depends on whether managers can 
effectively influence share prices. Kim and Park (2005) examine the relation between 
earnings management by SEO firms and the pricing of the SEOs. They find that 
equity issuers boost earnings before offerings and push offer prices up to increase 
offering proceeds. This finding can also be tested in the context of REITs, which is a 
desirable direction for future studies on this topic.
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